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CAN WE LOSE THE BATTLE AND STILL WIN THE
WAR?: THE FIGHT AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AFTER THE DEATH OF TITLE III OF THE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
INTRODUCTION
The time when a woman had to suffer-in silence and alone-be-
cause the criminal who abuses her happens to be her husband or
boyfriend is on its way to becoming ancient history . . . but just
because we have had some success does not mean we can become
complacent and abandon the fight against domestic violence .... I
It only took a year for Vincent Doan to kill Carrie Culberson. 2 On
the morning of August 29, 1996, Debra Culberson awoke to find her
worst fears had become a reality. Her daughter Carrie was missing
and last seen3 in the company of her ex-boyfriend Vincent Doan.4
Debra had good reason to fear for her daughter's life because over the
previous nine months Carrie had repeatedly suffered physical and
mental abuse at the hands of Doan.5
Doan had been vicious and violent towards Carrie, oblivious to who
was around when he threatened or hit her.6 In fact, Debra and her
family had even witnessed incidents, which had become progressively
1. Biden Webpage, infra note 455.
2. Although Carrie Culberson's body was never found, her disappearance was ruled a homi-
cide. See Culberson v. Doan, 65 F. Supp.2d 701, 704 (S.D. Ohio 1999). These facts were reiter-
ated in the pleadings and facts of the cited case in which Clarissa (Carrie) Culberson's estate and
her family brought suit against Doan claiming his "actions against Carrie were based primarily
on account of her gender in violation of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981
(VAWA I)." Id. Doan challenged the constitutionality of the VAWA I on its face and as applied,
claiming it was beyond the Commerce Clause powers of Congress. See id. The district court
held that the VAWA I was constitutional under the Commerce Clause and consistent with other
civil rights legislation enacted by Congress. See id. at 714.
3. Id. at 703. Doan's neighbor was the only witness to come forward and claim to have seen
Carrie on the day of her disappearance. See id.
4. Id. The witness testified that around 1:30 that morning he had seen Doan hitting Carrie on
the head. See id.
5. As in many domestic abuse cases, the violence in the relationship had escalated over time.
The family actually witnessed at least one occurrence when Doan attempted to hit Carrie. See
id. In July of 1996, Doan had thrown Carrie across the room and hit her in the head with a metal
object, causing her to need surgical staples in her scalp. See id. Three days before she disap-
peared, Doan had held Carrie at gunpoint in a barn. See id.
6. See Culberson, 65 F. Supp.2d at 703.
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more violent, in their own home. 7 Only one month before Carrie dis-
appeared, Doan had attacked her so brutally that, as a result of the
injuries, Carrie required surgical staples in her scalp.8 Debra's fear for
her daughter's life stemmed not only from the fact that Carrie had last
been seen with her violent ex-boyfriend but also because she had rea-
son to believe that the police would not do anything until it was too
late.9 Over the previous two years, Debra and Carrie had filed nu-
merous criminal reports documenting Doan's violent behavior and the
threats that he made against Carrie.10 However, the police never filed
charges. 1' Although this incident was not the first time that Doan had
hit Carrie, it would be the last time. Even if they had tried, the police
could not have done anything.' 2 It was too late for Carrie.13 Debra
would never see her daughter again.
One year after Carrie Culberson's disappearance, a jury found Vin-
cent Doan guilty of aggravated murder and sentenced him to life im-
prisonment without parole.' 4 Sadly, Carrie's story is not unusual, 15
7. According to Debra, Doan had attempted to physically assault Carrie in her home and
when Debra refused to get out of the way and attempted to intervene, Doan assaulted Debra.
See id.
8. See id.
9. Id. Carrie and her family had called the police to file criminal reports against Doan at least
four out of the five times he had attacked Carrie in recent months, yet no charges were ever filed
against him. See id. In fact, on the day that Debra reported Carrie missing the police chief, who
filed the missing persons report, made sure to visit Doan's best friend, Baker (later arrested as
an accomplice) to warn him that Doan was now a suspect. See id.
10. Id.
11. See id. Debra testified that when she reported her daughter missing to the Police Chief of
Blanchester, she reminded him of the threats Doan had made to Carrie and the criminal reports
she had filed. See id. Debra claimed that the Chief responded, "Why does she keep going back
to it?" Id. For further discussion of police responses to domestic violence situations and the
problem of underenforcement, see infra Part II.A.l.a.
12. On the evening Carrie disappeared, Doan was seen leaving his house with blood on his
clothes and carrying several garbage bags. Culberson, 65 F. Supp.2d at 704. According to wit-
nesses from the search party who looked for Carrie after her disappearance, dogs tracked Car-
rie's scent to a pond in Doan's best friend's junkyard, with Doan's friend present at the time. Id.
When the search party asked the police chief about draining the pond he wanted to wait until the
next day. Id. According to witnesses, the pond was drained a day later and nothing was found
except footprints at the bottom of the pond and a muddy trail in the brush leading away from the
area. See id.
13. See id. The evidence was so great against Doan that he was convicted without the body of
Carrie. See id. In fact, her body has yet to be located. Id.
14. Culberson, 65 F. Supp.2d at 704.
15. Statistics show that domestic violence is the single largest cause of injury to women in the
United States, and that it accounts for thirty percent of all murders of women. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES V (1998). See also Deborah Epstein, Effective
Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the
Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 4 (1999) (discussing domestic violence statistics and
the lack of support for state intervention). In the legislative hearings before the enactment of
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however, it is particularly disturbing because her murder could have
been prevented. In Carrie's case, as with many cases of domestic vio-
lence, the abuse was not only public knowledge, 16 but the victim, as
well as her family, had tried to get her help. 17 Yet, the criminal justice
system had failed Carrie and her family, and effectively left them pow-
erless to stop a relentless Doan.18
Cases like that of Carrie Culberson reiterate the need for the
United States to treat violence against women as a serious problem in
society. Congress recognized this need when it enacted the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA I),19 specifically Title 111,20 which pro-
vided victims of gender-motivated violence 2' with the opportunity to
Title III of the VAWA I, Congress cited to statistics that "in 1991, at least 21,000 domestic crimes
were reported to the police every week .... S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993).
16. Doan had begun abusing Carrie by threatening her and pushing her around. See Culber-
son, 65 F. Supp.2d at 703-04. Within a matter of months he was hitting her in the head and
throwing her across the room. See id.
17. Id. at 703. See supra note 9.
18. After Carrie's death, Title III of the VAWA I gave Carrie's family the option to file suit
against Doan, and they exercized that option. See Culberson, 65 F. Supp.2d at 702-03. The case
is currently pending. See Culberson v. Doan, 72 F. Supp.2d 865 (1999) (denying Doan's motion
for summary judgment).
19. The VAWA I is a subchapter of the Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act. See
Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902-55 (codified in part at 42
U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)). After four years of testimony and hearings illustrating the pervasiveness
of violence against women and the dramatic effect it was having on the United States and its
economy, Congress explicitly recognized violence against women as a national problem in need
of a national solution. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993) (stating that the "[VAWA I] repre-
sents an essential step in forging a national consensus that our society will not tolerate violence
against women").
20. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). For a precise reading of Title III, see infra note 22.
21. See Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1902, 1941
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994)). This provision, entitled Right To Be Free From
Crimes of Violence, provides that "all persons within the United States shall have the right to be
free from crimes of violence motivated by gender." Id. Although Title III is gender-neutral, the
focus of this Comment will be on violence against women from a domestic violence perspective.
The term "victim" will be used interchangeably with "survivor" and will refer to females as the
victims and men as the abusers or attackers. It is a fact that men are also victims of domestic
violence, at the hands of both men and women, nonetheless, statistics show that women are
more likely to be abused by a male intimate. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS., U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, No. NCJ-167237, VIOLENCE By INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CUR-
RENT OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS AND GIRLFRIENDS 1 (1998) [hereinafter VIOLENCE By
INTIMATES]. The term "intimate" includes current and former spouses, boyfriends, and girl-
friends. Id. at 4. In March of 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics
released a report presenting a summary of the statistical information about violence committed
against intimates. See id. The report concluded that "intimate violence predominately affects
women as victims," representing "about 21% of the violent crimes experienced by women ......
See id. According to the report, "although less likely than males to experience violent crime
overall, females are 5 to 8 times more likely than males to be victimized by an intimate." Id.
The report also confirmed the traditional notion about domestic violence: that women are usu-
ally the victims. See id. at 1 (noting that women represent about eighty-five percent of the vic-
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bring a civil suit in federal court in order to obtain monetary relief
from an abuser or attacker.2 2 Congress enacted Title III in 1994, pur-
suant to its powers under the Commerce Clause2 3 and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 24 less than a year before the Supreme Court's landmark
decision concerning the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez. 25
tims, of the more than 960,000 incidents of violence against an intimate). See also Hanna, infra
note 113, at 1513 n.25.
22. Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1902, 1941 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994)). This provision, entitled Cause of Action, states:
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence motivated by
gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) shall be liable
to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem
appropriate.
Id.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[11o regu-
late Commerce ... among the several States .... " Id. Congress enacted the VAWA I pursuant
to its Commerce Clause powers noting that "[tihe Commerce Clause is a broad grant of power
allowing Congress to reach conduct that has even the slightest effect on interstate commerce;
Congress need only have a 'rational basis' for creating such a law." S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54
(1993). Congress supported the connection between violent acts directed at women and inter-
state commerce with statistical studies and testimony from the legislative hearings. See infra
notes 254-386 and accompanying text. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, analyzed Title III in light of
the Commerce Clause and found that the connection between interstate commerce and violence
against women was too attenuated. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State Uni-
versity, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). For a
discussion of the problems associated with the enactment of Title III pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, see infra note 28.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "No
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. It
also states: "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." Id. at § 5. Congress declared its authority to enact Title III of the VAWA I
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 55 (1993). Congress indi-
cated that the purpose of Title III of the VAWA I was to redress gender-motivated violence
committed by individuals, not the state. See id. (noting that Congress is authorized to enact
"appropriate legislation to enforce the [Fourteenth] Amendment's guarantee of equal rights"
and declaring Title III as "appropriate legislation"). Such assertion of authority is highly prob-
lematic, however, statutes enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment have generally been lim-
ited to proscribing state action. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966) ("It is a
commonplace that rights under the Equal Protection Clause itself arise only where there has
been involvement of the State or of one acting under the color of its authority."); Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (determining section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to be appli-
cable only to actions involving the states, and noting that the Fourteenth Amendment only au-
thorizes Congress to provide redress against equal protection violation of state laws); JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 595 (5th ed. 1995) [hereinafter No-
WAK & ROTUNDA] ("The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by its own
terms applies only to state and local governments."); Mabbun, infra note 28, at 240-43 (arguing
that because Title III does not address violations committed by the states or remedy conduct of
an individual it "cannot be deemed appropriate legislation" under the Fourteenth Amendment).
25. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2001] LOSE THE BATTLE AND WIN THE WAR? 923
Five years after Lopez, the Supreme Court in United States v. Mor-
rison2 6 declared that Congress had exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted
Title III of the VAWA 1.27 This Comment will explore the continued
need for this type of legislation and the available alternatives in light
of the Supreme Court's decision 28 to uphold the Fourth Circuit Court
26. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
27. Id. at 1759.
28. This Comment will not enter the debate as to the wisdom of the Supreme Court's decision
holding Title III unconstitutional, but rather will focus on the ramifications of the decision on the
fight against domestic violence. Numerous articles have been written concerning the issue of
Congress' constitutional powers to enact Title 1l1. For an article detailing why the Supreme
Court should have found Title III constitutional, see Senator Joseph R. Biden, The Civil Rights
Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Defense, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 1 (2000). Prior
to the decision in Morrison, the majority of articles that addressed the constitutionality of Title
III argued that it was a constitutional enactment under Congress' Commerce Clause powers. See
Jennifer Lynn Crawford, Note, America's Dark Little Secret: Challenging the Constitutionality of
the Civil Rights Provision of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 189
(1997) (arguing the Title III of the VAWA I satisfies the standards set forth in Lopez and com-
pares Title III to other statutes upheld under Commerce Clause); Christine Conover, Student
Recent Development, The Violence Against Women Act: Stabilizing Commerce Through a Civil
Rights Remedy, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 269 (1997) (analogizing the enactment of Title III to
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and arguing that it supplements available state
action); Rebecca E. Hatch, Note, The Violence Against Women Act: Surviving the Substantial
Effects of United States v. Lopez, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 423 (1997) (calling for the Supreme
Court to uphold Title III due to the legislative findings connecting gender-motivated violence to
interstate commerce and the fact that the provision compliments existing state laws); Judi L.
Lemos, Comment, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: Connecting Gender-Motivated Vio-
lence to Interstate Commerce, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1251 (1998) (predicting that the Supreme
Court would deny certiorari to Brzonkala and nevertheless the congressional findings in enact-
ing the VAWA I ensured its constitutionality); Peter J. Liuzzo, Comment, Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic and State University: The Constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act-
Recognizing That Violence Targeted at Women Affects Interstate Commerce, 63 BROOK. L. REV.
367 (1997) (arguing against the district court's opinion finding Title III unconstitutional in
Brzonkala and calling for deference to the legislative findings); Kelli C. McTaggart, Note, The
Violence Against Women Act: Recognizing A Federal Right to Be Free From Gender-Motivated
Violence, 86 GEO. L.J. 1123 (1998) (arguing that Title III should be upheld due to the extensive
congressional findings linking it to interstate commerce and that federalism should not be a
concern since the Act supplements state laws); Lori L. Schick, Comment, Breaking the "Rule of
Thumb" and Opening the Curtains-Can the Violence Against Women Act Survive Constitutional
Scrutiny?, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 887 (1997) (explaining that the district court's opinion in
Brzonkala adopted a "far too restrictive view of Lopez" and the congressional findings show a
sufficient link to interstate commerce); Megan Weinstein, Comment, The Violence Against
Women Act After United States v. Lopez: Defending the Act From Constitutional Challenge, 12
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 119 (1997) (discussing the need for Title III and distinguishing the
Lopez Commerce Clause analysis from an analysis of Title III); Carolyn Peri Weiss, Recent De-
velopment: Title III of The Violence Against Women Act: Constitutionally Safe and Sound, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (1997) (criticizing the district court's opinion in Brzonkala and declaring
Title III as appropriate and necessary legislation); Melanie L. Winskie, Note, Can Federalism
Save the Violence Against Women Act?, 31 GA. L. REV. 985 (1997) (stating that Title III of the
VAWA I is only "filling in the gap left by the states" and is a valid exercise of Congress' Com-
merce Clause powers). Fewer articles have addressed whether Title III should be found as a
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of Appeals' ruling, in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute &
State University,2 9 that Title III is unconstitutional under the Com-
merce Clause 30 and the Fourteenth Amendment.31 In discussing the
constitutional enactment under Congress' Fourteenth Amendment powers. See Danielle M.
Houck, Note, VAWA After Lopez: Reconsidering Congressional Power Under the Fourteenth
Amendment in Light of Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University, 31 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 625 (1998) (arguing that in light of Lopez, Title III is an unconstitutional enactment
under the Commerce Clause, but constitutional under an "expansive" reading of section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Melinda M. Renshaw, Comment, Choosing Between Principles of Fed-
eral Power: The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 47 EMORY L.J. 819, 857
(1998) (noting that "[t]he current inability of states to prevent and remedy gender-motivated
crimes constitutes an affirmative action that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment"). For arguments that support the Supreme Court's rationale, in U.S.
v.Morrison, that Title Ill is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, see Mary C. Carty,
Comment, Doe v. Doe and the Violence Against Women Act: A Post-Lopez; Commerce Clause
Analysis, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 465 (1997) (arguing that the Commerce Clause does not extend
to Title Ill, noting federalism concerns such as interference with state functions and a burden on
federal courts); Houck, supra (arguing that in light of Lopez, Title III was an unconstitutional
enactment under the Commerce Clause); Yvette J. Mabbun, Comment, Title IIl of the Violence
Against Women Act: The Answer To Domestic Violence or a Constitutional Time-Bomb?, 29 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 207 (1997) (discussing the possibility of unconstitutionality and arguing that a
change in the language might save Title III); Stacey L. McKinley, Note, The Violence Against
Women Act After United States v. Lopez Will Domestic Violence Jurisdiction Be Returned To the
States?, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 345 (1996) (predicting that Title III will be invalidated under a
Commerce Clause analysis and noting that the states should implement this type of law); Charles
Mincavage, Comment, Title III of the Violence Against Women Act: Can It Survive a Commerce
Clause Challenge In the Wake of United States v. Lopez, 102 DICK. L. REV. 441 (1998) (predict-
ing that the Supreme Court will decide the issue in the near future, breaking down how each
Justice might vote and concluding that the Court will find it unconstitutional); Jennifer C. Phil-
pot, Note, Violence Against Women and the Commerce Clause: Can This Marriage Survive?, 85
Ky. L.J. 767 (1996-1997) (analogizing Title IIl to the statute in Lopez and arguing that more
than congressional findings are needed to save Title III, since its connection to interstate com-
merce is so attenuated); Renshaw, supra, at 842 (same).
29. 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
30. See supra note 28 (listing sources detailing the analysis of Title III in light of Lopez, and
how it is beyond Congress' Commerce Clause powers). In 1991, Chief Justice Rehnquist ex-
pressed concern over the proposal of the VAWA I and its effect on federal courts by appointing
an Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Violence to coordinate the Judicial Conference Re-
sponse to the Act and to ascertain the impact on the federal courts. Bassler, infra note 134, at
1148. The Committee supported the policies underlying the VAWA I, but opposed certain provi-
sions, including Title III, because of the effect it would have on federal court dockets and the
concern that the federal/state balance would be disrupted. See id. (arguing that Title III federal-
izes an area of the law that is better handled by the states). Congress spent four years con-
ducting hearings before enacting Title Il1. Id. Before the United States Supreme Court's
decision in U.S. v. Lopez, it would have seemed that legislative findings connecting an action to
interstate commerce would be enough. The importance of legislative findings was called into
question by the Lopez decision. See Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance
on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEOis. 369 (1999)
(discussing studies about the Supreme Court's reliance on findings and concluding that they have
been cited to very little since the late 1980s).
31. See supra note 24. In Brzonkala, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
district court that legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' Fourteenth Amendment powers
could not be directed at private actors. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 889.
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Supreme Court's decision, Part II will explore the reasoning behind
the enactment of Title III and the need for legislation addressing vio-
lence against women.32 Part II will also briefly discuss the Court's
rationale for finding Title III unconstitutional. 33 Part III will argue
that despite the Court's decision, Congress could protect the civil
rights of domestic violence victims through the reenactment of Title
III pursuant to its Thirteenth Amendment powers.34 Part III will also
explore the alternatives that states have begun to consider in order to
effectively address the problem of domestic violence.35 Further, Part
III will discuss the need for the federal government to continue work-
ing with the states and the need for all states to aggressively deal with
domestic violence issues through other provisions of the VAWA I,
state constitutions, and hate crime bills that protect gender. 36 Part III
will conclude by addressing the future of the right to be free from
gender-motivated violence as a civil right.37 Part IV will consider the
impact of the Supreme Court's decision on other federal legislation
and, correspondingly, the subsequent efforts of the states to deal with
violence against women. 38 Part V will conclude that the loss of Title
III is a step backward in the fight against domestic violence, but that
its enactment began a national movement against domestic violence
that must continue.39
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Enactment of Title III of the VAWA I
Violence against women affects women of all racial, ethnic, and so-
cial classes,40 and has become a problem of epidemic proportions fac-
ing this country.41 Carrie Culberson's story is only one example of the
seriousness of this issue. The national statistics concerning violence
against women are startling.42 For example, violence is the leading
32. See infra notes 40-194 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 195-288 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 289-358 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 359-438 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 439-448 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 449-453 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 454-484 and accompanying text.
39. See infra note 485 and accompanying text.
40. Acts of violence against women include, but are not limited to, rape, sexual assault, bat-
tery, assault, armed robbery, and murder. This Comment will focus more specifically on domes-
tic violence against women. For current statistics on domestic violence and its victims, see
VIOLENCE By INTIMATES, supra note 21 (noting that women of all races were equally vulnerable
to attacks by intimates).
41. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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cause of injuries to women ages fifteen to forty-four, and affects more
women than automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer deaths com-
bined. 43 As many as four million women a year are the victims of
domestic violence, 44 and three out of four women will be the victims
of violent crime sometime during their lives.45 In response to the
problems of domestic violence and other violent crimes against
women, coupled with the failure of the states to adequately deal with
these problems,46 Congress enacted the VAWA I.47
The VAWA I, enacted in 1994, pursuant to Congress' Commerce
Clause and Fourteenth Amendment powers, signified an unprece-
dented and comprehensive attack on the problem of violence against
women. 48 The act represented this nation's first attempt to address
gender-motivated violence, a problem facing society that has been tra-
ditionally ignored or otherwise regarded as a private issue.49 The
VAWA I was over four years in the making, a result of extensive hear-
43. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993) (citing United States Surgeon General Antonio
Novello, From the Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Services, 267 JAMA 3132 (1992)).
44. See id. at 36, n.3 (citing testimony of Dr. Angela Browne before the Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Senate Hearing 101-939, part 2, 101st Cong., 2d sess., Dec. 11, 1990, at
116-117).
45. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 38 (1991) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 29 (2d ed., 1988)).
46. See S. REP, No. 102-197, at 43 (1991) (stating that "[s]tate remedies have proven insuffi-
cient to protect women against some of the most persistent and serious of crimes"). For a discus-
sion of the inadequacy of state criminal law, see infra notes 96-183 and accompanying text.
47. The first version of the VAWA I was introduced on June 19, 1990. See Victoria P. Nourse,
Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights
Remedy, 11 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 7-13 (1996) (recounting the first drafts and hearings of the
VAWA I).
48. Congress concluded that "[g]ender-based crimes and the fear of gender-based crimes re-
strict movement, reduce employment opportunities, increase health expenditures, and reduces
consumer spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and the national economy." S. REP.
No. 102-197, at 53 (1991). See Margaret A. Cain, Comment, The Civil Rights Provision of the
Violence Against Women Act: Its Legacy and Future, 34 TULSA L.J. 367, 383-385 (1999) (discuss-
ing the specific statistics from the congressional findings). The VAWA I was the first legislation
to specifically recognize gender-motivated violence as a national problem and to provide a civil
right to be free from it. Id.
49. This is especially true when referring to domestic violence. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence
Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 3 (arguing that the VAWA I
should be examined in the context of "the current controversy over gender-specific concepts of
privacy," and that contrary to traditional notions, domestic violence is not just a private, individ-
ual harm); Epstein, supra note 15, at 10 (quoting a North Carolina Supreme Court Judge from
1874: "If no permanent injury has been inflicted..., it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the
public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive"); Karla M. Digirolamo, Myths and Mis-
conceptions About Domestic Violence, 16 PACE L. REV. 41, 42 (1995) (addressing the issue of
privacy in the context of domestic violence); Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights For Battered
Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 LAW & INEQ. 1, 22-27 (1992) (discussing the historical legal
discrimination affecting women and its survival due partly to the failure of officials to see beyond
the common law private treatment of domestic violence and familial relationships).
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ings, debates, testimony, and legislative findings documenting the
troubling effects that violence against women has on both victims 50
and society as a whole.51 In response to its findings, Congress created
the numerous provisions of the VAWA I, focusing on prevention of
gender-motivated violence through education,5 2 deterrence, 53 and res-
titution for victims.5 4
Congress structured the VAWA I to "remedy not only the violent
effects of the problem, but the subtle prejudices that lurk behind it,"55
acknowledging that "none of the proposals of... [the VAWA I], alone
or together, are likely to end violence against women. '56 The VAWA
I contained numerous provisions scattered throughout the United
States Code, including provisions which provided federal funding for
states,57 education-prevention programs,58 new federal domestic vio-
lence crimes,59 and full faith and credit for protection orders.60 Al-
50. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 38 (1991) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 29 (2d ed., 1998)).
51. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1991). For a discussion of the congressional findings and
the economic impact of gender-motivated violence on employers, see Biden, supra note 28, at
20-25; Liuzzo, supra note 28, at 370-71.
52. See 42 U.S.C. H3 13991-14002 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996). Otherwise known as Subtitle D-
Equal Justice For Women In Courts, this provision authorizes funding to counter gender biases
in state and federal courts through training. The "VAWA provided federal grant money for
community efforts to fight violence against women." Cain, supra note 48, at 368. The funding
under the VAWA I was provided to communities for many uses, including domestic violence
shelters, 42 U.S.C. § 10402(a)(1) (1996), state databases to track reporting of rape and domestic
violence, id. at § 13962 (1995), and reports on battered women's syndrome, id. at § 14013 (1995).
53. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2265 (2000). Section 2261 makes intimate domestic violence a fel-
ony. Id. at § 2261 (2000). Section 2262 prohibits interstate violation of an order of protection.
Id. at § 2262 (2000). Section 2263 allows the victim in a VAWA prosecution to testify during a
pretrial detention hearing. Id. at § 2263 (2000). Section 2265 provides that courts nationwide
shall give full faith and credit to all valid protection orders that state courts issue. Id. at § 2265
(2000). See Fine, infra note 132, at 259-60; Catherine F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: Interstate
Enforcement of Protection Orders Under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 29 FAM. L.Q.
253, 254-57 (1995) (discussing subtitles of the VAWA I with emphasis on 18 U.S.C. § 2265).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2264 provides for restitution to the victim, regardless of any other civil or
criminal penalties the law provides. Title II1, allows victims of gender-motivated violence to sue
their abusers/attackers for compensation. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1996).
55. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (1993).
56. Id.
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (gg) (1995).
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2000).
59. See id. As for the criminal provisions, thus far all of the courts to address the criminal
provisions have found them to be constitutional enactments under Congress' Commerce Clause
powers. See U.S. v. Von Foelkel, 136 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758 (4th
Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.
N.Y. 1997). For an in-depth analysis of the criminal provisions of the Act, see Michelle W.
Easterling, Student Work, For Better or Worse: The Federalization of Domestic Violence, 98 W.
VA. L. REV. 933 (1996) (discussing the background of the criminal provisions and the pros and
cons of the enactment).
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though the provisions of the VAWA I ran the gamut of legal areas and
issues, only Title III, the provision many considered to be the most
significant,61 faced serious constitutional challenges. 62
From the beginning, Congress recognized the potential challenges
Title III might face. In fact, Title III represented the most controver-
sial, yet most "closely considered, '63 provision of the VAWA 1.64 Title
III established a federal civil right cause of action for victims of gen-
der-motivated violent crimes, 65 and provided victims with the oppor-
tunity to bring a civil claim in federal court against their attackers in
order to receive injunctive or monetary relief.66 Following its enact-
ment, the constitutionality of Title III became the subject of great de-
bate.67 Yet, until 1996, when the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia decided Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic
Institute & State University,68 each of the federal district courts that
had considered the constitutionality of Title III had upheld the provi-
sion as constitutional. 69 In Brzonkala, the district court held that Title
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2000). Although numerous other provisions are included in the Act,
this Comment will focus on 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1996), Title III (The Civil Rights Remedy). For a
discussion of other provisions of the Act, see supra notes 52-54.
61. See Weinstein, supra note 28, at 120 (declaring Title III as an "imperfect solution to the
problem against women," but that it needs to be maintained to protect women from violence);
McTaggart, supra note 28, at 1150 (arguing that Title III is "important and necessary to secure
federal protection of women's civil rights); Crawford, supra note 28, at 235 (recognizing that
Title Ill would help in achieving the goal of categorically stopping violence against women);
Winskie, supra note 28, at 1029 (arguing that Title III is needed to "fill the gap left by the states'
failure to enforce" the criminal laws on behalf of female victims of violence); Cain, supra note
48, at 405 (noting that regardless of constitutionality, the need for Title III is clear).
62. See Doe v. Mercer 37 F. Supp.2d 64 (D. Mass. 1999) (upholding Title III as a constitu-
tional exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause powers); Kuhn v. Kuhn, 1999 WL 519326 (N.D.
11. 1999) (same); Culberson v. Doan, 65 F. Supp.2d 701 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (same); Cristonino v.
City of New York City Housing Authority, 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same); Anisimov v.
Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Il1. 1997) (same); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn.
1997) (same); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 134
F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) (same). But see
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(holding Title III unconstitutional); Bergeron v. Bergeron, 48 F. Supp.2d 628 (M.D. La. 1999)
(same); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va.
1996) (same).
63. Biden, supra note 28, at 4.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1996). The short title is "Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-Moti-
vated Violence Act." See Cain, supra note 48, at 367 (noting that Title III is the "most contro-
versial aspect of VAWA").
65. Id.
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1996).
67. See supra note 28.
68. 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
69. Some cases decided before and after the district court decided Brzonkala, upheld the con-
stitutionality of Title III of the VAWA I. See supra note 62.
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III was an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.70 The Brzonkala
decision became a great concern for supporters of the VAWA I when
in May of 1999, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the first federal
appellate court to address the issue, agreed with the district court in a
rehearing en banc.71
After the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Brzonkala,
and the confusion in the federal courts that followed, 72 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to Brzonkala under United States v. Morri-
son,73 in order to settle the debate over Title III's consitutionality. In
May of 2000, the Court declared that Title III was unconstitutional in
light of its landmark decision in Lopez, 74 concerning the Commerce
Clause, and the settled jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.7 5 As a result, Title III is no longer an available avenue of relief
for victims of domestic violence. Since Title III represented much
needed legislation, alternatives should now be seriously considered. 76
To fully explore the alternatives to Title III, it is important to under-
70. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 896 (holding that Title III could not be sustained under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was directed at private action and that Title III
was an invalid enactment under the Congress' commerce clause powers and was interfering in a
traditional state area).
71. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted U.S. v. Morrison, 527 U.S. 1068
(1999), judgment affd 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
72. See supra note 62.
73. 527 U.S. 1068 (1999).
74. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Lopez represented a departure from traditional Com-
merce Clause analysis and was considered somewhat of an anomaly prior to Morrison. See Mab-
bun, supra note 28, at 237-38 (discussing Lopez and noting that it was unique, marking the first
time since 1936 that legislation had been considered beyond Congress' Commerce Clause
power); Cain, supra note 48, at 398-400 (same). Many commentators and scholars have criti-
cized the Lopez decision as being hard for lower courts to follow. See generally Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 22 NOVA L. REV. 741 (1998) (discussing the
confusion in Commerce Clause jurisprudence resulting from the Lopez decision); Mincavage,
supra note 28, at 479 (predicting that the Supreme Court would hear Brzonkala and noting that
it would give the Court the opportunity to clarify Lopez); Mabbun, supra note 28, at 233-39
(speculating as to what Lopez would actually mean for the VAWA I and discussing cases where
the district courts have had a difficult time following Lopez).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Traditionally, courts have required a state action for Con-
gress to enact remedial legislation for an Equal Protection violation pursuant to section five of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966) ("It is commonplace
that rights under the Equal Protection Clause itself arise only where there has been involvement
of the State or of one acting under the color of authority."). Although section five of the Four-
teenth Amendment grants relatively broad congressional powers, it does not cover discrimina-
tory acts by private actors. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1756.
76. Generally, the commentators who have argued that Title III is unconstitutional have rec-
ognized the need for such legislation. For a discussion of saving Title III through a Thirteenth
Amendment defense, see infra Part III.A; Hearn, supra note 86.
930 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:919
stand the concerns and factors that led to the enactment of the
legislation.
Throughout this country's history, Congress has enacted legislation
in response to social problems. For example, in the 1960s, Congress
passed one of the most important pieces of legislation in this country's
history, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.77 The Civil Rights Act recog-
nized the federal civil rights of all citizens. 78 Although it was enacted
primarily in response to racial discrimination, 79 the Civil Rights Act of
1964, also known as Title VII, has been recognized as the first signifi-
cant piece of federal legislation to protect women's civil rights. 80
Thirty years later, with the enactment of Title III, Congress, for the
first time, declared that violence against women constituted gender
discrimination.81 Congress discussed the need for a civil rights remedy
based on gender, focusing specifically on the need for both society and
the criminal justice system to recognize that "attacks motivated by
gender bias ... [should] be considered as serious as crimes motivated
by religious, racial, or political bias."'82 While acknowledging that vio-
lent crime is a threat to our nation, afflicting men, women, and chil-
dren, Congress specifically noted that "there are some crimes ... that
disproportionately burden women. '83
77. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-(h)6 (1994).
78. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 970.
79. See id. at § 14.6.
80. See McTaggart, supra note 28, at 1123. Many scholars have noted that gender was in-
cluded in Title VII to ensure its failure. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY,
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 15-16 (2d ed. 1995) (stating that
the purpose of Judge Howard Worth Smith's amendment that introduced the word "sex" into
the list of impermissible bases for employment decisions was to make the whole bill "so contro-
versial that it would fail"); MARY BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN
SERIOUSLY 21 (1st ed. 1994) (noting that gender was introduced into Title VII "jokingly by a
southern 'gentleman' to kill the whole of Title VII by making its anti-discrimination provision
ridiculous").
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 13981 (1996). In enacting Title III, Congress acknowledged the connec-
tion between Title VII and Title III of the VAWA I. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 48 (1993)
(stating that "gender discrimination may take the form not only of a lost pay raise or promotion,
but also a violent, criminal attack"). For an account of the enactment of Title III, see generally
Nourse supra, note 47, at 5 (discussing the various versions of the provision that were consid-
ered, the scope, and the power Congress used to enact Title I1). See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 48
(1993) (stating that "Congress has the power to recognize that violence motivated by gender bias
'is not merely an individual crime or a personal injury, but it is a form of discrimination"');
"Women and Violence," Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (June 20, 1990) (written testimony of Helen Neuborne). See Brenneke, supra
note 49, at 1102 (discussing the enactment of Title III and the innovation it represented); Reva
B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2197
(1996) (stating that Title III "broke new ground").
82. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
83. Id. at 37.
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In further support for Title III, Congress noted that American soci-
ety has continually failed to recognize the disproportionate burden of
violent crime on women, stating that "[v]iolence against women re-
flects as much a failure of our Nation's collective willingness to con-
front the problem as it does the failure of our Nation's laws and
regulations. '84 In addition, Congress found an inherent bias within
both the states' legal systems and the law enforcement bodies that
handle cases of violent acts against women.85 Congress concluded
that federal legislation was necessary due to the absence of adequate
federal legislation8 6 and the states' failure to sufficiently deal with the
pervasive problem.87 In response to these findings, Congress struc-
tured Title III to specifically address those problem areas. 88
1. Inadequacy of the State Criminal Justice System
Domestic violence, as well as other violent acts against women, has
traditionally been handled by the state criminal justice system. 89 For
many years, women have sought justice through the state criminal sys-
tem for violent crimes90 such as domestic violence,91 battery,92 as-
sault,93  kidnapping,94  or rape.95  Although many have found
84. Id.
85. See infra notes 89-175 and accompanying text.
86. See also infra notes 166-169 and accompanying text (discussing the federal statutes in exis-
tence at the time of Title III's enactment); Marcellene Elizabeth Hearn, Comment, A Thirteenth
Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1111-13
(1998) (discussing the legislative findings by Congress specifically); Cain, supra note 48, at 383-84
(arguing that the existing federal statutes are inadequate, specifically noting that "none of these
statutes allowed redress for violence committed in the home").
87. See infra notes 176-196 and accompanying text.
88. See Biden, supra note 28, at 2-7 (discussing the national scope of violence against women
and the role states have played in perpetuating the problem).
89. See infra notes 90-96.
90. See Brenneke, supra note 49 at 29-30 (exploring state criminal law in the context of do-
mestic violence); Hart, infra note 116, at 211 (elaborating on the role of the criminal justice
system in the context of violence against women).
91. Domestic violence is usually defined as violence between two people who have an inti-
mate personal relationship. For example, in Illinois, domestic battery is codified at 720 Illinois
Compiled Statutes 5/12-3.2 (1993) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para 12-3.2 (1991)). Pursu-
ant to Illinois law, domestic battery is equated with simple battery and is considered a class A
misdemeanor. JOHN F. DECKER, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW §9.26 (2d ed.) (1995). Under Illinois
law, domestic situations that result in an arrest might also fall under assault, aggravated assault,
or aggravated battery. See infra notes 92-93.
92. For an example of a state statute for battery see Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/12-3 (1993)
(formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-3 (1991)). Illinois has also codified aggravated bat-
tery, which is considered a felony. Aggravated battery requires proof of a battery and "certain
aggravating circumstances, each of which requires an additional social evil and merits a more
serious sanction." DECKER, supra note 91, at §9.20.
93. For an example of state codification of the crime of assault, see Illinois Compiled Statutes
5/12-1 (1993) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-1 (1991)). Illinois has also codified
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vindication through the system, state laws still suffer from major flaws
that prevent effective and adequate remedies for victims of gender-
motivated violence. 96 The VAWA I was "intended to respond both to
the underlying attitude that this violence [was] somewhat less serious
than other crime and to the resulting failure of our criminal justice
system to address such violence. 97
One of the motivating factors behind Title III was the conclusion
that the states were not adequately dealing with the problem of vio-
lence against women. 98 Congress specifically cited to the lack of state
laws addressing the problem, 99 inadequate existing remedies, 100 and
uneven enforcement of existing laws.10 Congress found support in
over seventeen studies conducted by the states, which discovered that
crimes against women are treated less seriously than other violent
crimes.'0 2 Accordingly, Congress concluded that "[s]tate ... criminal
laws do not adequately protect against the bias element of gender-
motivated crimes, which separates these crimes from acts of random
aggravated assault, which covers assaults that are committed under circumstances of aggrava-
tion. See DECKER, supra note 91, at §9.09.
94. For example, kidnapping in Illinois requires unlawful seizure and secret confinement. See
DECKER, supra note 91, at §7.03. Kidnapping has been codified in Illinois as 720 Illinois Com-
piled Statutes 5/10-1 (1993) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-1 (1991)).
95. For an example of how a state looks at the crime of rape see "The Criminal Sexual Act of
1984" 720 Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/12-12 to 5/12-18 (1993) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 12-12 to 12-18 (1991)). "The Criminal Sexual Act" includes codification of crimes such as
criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse and aggravated
criminal sexual abuse. See DECKER, supra note 91, at §8.02.
96. See Cain, supra note 48, at 377-80 (discussing the inadequacy of the state response to
domestic violence, specifically, the misperception of victims, the problems with enforcement, and
the unequal sentencing guidelines). Many commentators have mentioned the historical doc-
trines that might be seen as the foundation for the lack of seriousness accorded to violence
against women in the states. See infra notes 293-299. See also Epstein, supra note 15, at 9-10
(discussing the early American court system and its response to incidents of domestic violence).
The English common law treatment of women will be discussed further infra Part III.A.2. con-
cerning the Thirteenth Amendment.
97. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
98. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
99. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
100. Congress specifically stated that "[s]tate and federal criminal laws do not adequately pro-
tect against the bias element of gender-motivated crimes .... " S. REP. No. 102-197, at 27 (1991).
For an analysis of what states are doing to protect against the bias of gender-motivated crimes
such as state hate crime bills and equal rights amendments to state constitutions, see infra Part
III.B.3.
101. See Hearn, supra note 86, at 1111-12 (discussing the congressional findings specifically);
Mabbun, supra note 28, at 216 (noting that gender bias in the criminal justice system has resulted
in underenforcement of the existing laws); Brenneke, supra note 49, at 29-31 (discussing gender
bias in the state legal system and its effects); Cain, supra note 48 (same).
102. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52 (1993) (discussing how domestic violence is not taken as
seriously as stranger violence). See also Hearn supra note 86, at 1111-12 (discussing gender bias
and the resulting treatment of violent crime against women).
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violence, nor do those laws adequately provide victims of gender-mo-
tivated crimes the opportunity to vindicate their interests.' 10 3 Con-
gress found that as a result of the inadequacy of the state criminal
justice systems, women who were victims of violence were less likely
to come forward and seek help. 10 4
To understand how state criminal laws fail, it is necessary to recog-
nize that the purpose of Title III was to go beyond state criminal laws
by not only bringing attention to the plight of victims of gender-moti-
vated violence, but also to redress "an assault on a commonly shared
ideal of equality.' 05 In contrast to Title III, state criminal laws focus
on the individual state's interest in protecting its citizens.' 0 6 State laws
may remedy singular situations of violence, but often fail to address a
victim's interest in equal treatment or to recognize the "broader socie-
tal implications"']0 7 of violence against women. Accordingly, Title III,
along with the other provisions of the VAWA I, supplied what "[s]tate
laws [did] not provide, and by their nature [could not] provide, a na-
tional antidiscrimination standard.' 10 8
The main criticism of state criminal laws involved the enforcement
of the laws, not the content of the laws themselves. Specifically, in the
incidents of violence against women, "[a]t every step of the way, the
criminal justice system poses significant hurdles for victims."'1 9 The
gender biases within state law enforcement and the state judicial sys-
103. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 27 (1991). The question here might be what exactly are the
victim's "interests" to be vindicated? The Culberson case is an example of a situation where
none of the victim's interests were vindicated, at least not while she was alive. Many times the
victim's interest will be in escaping the situation and making sure that her family is provided for.
Many women who are victims of domestic violence are financially dependent on their abusers
and a successful criminal case would only place her supporter (and abuser) in a position where
he would no longer provide for her or her family. Women are often torn between the desire to
escape the abuse and a feeling of obligation to keep the family together in the hope that the
abuse will stop. See Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving the Beatings of 1996, 11
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 303, 307-09 (1997). Many women are so emotionally and economically de-
pendent on their spouses that they can see no alternative to staying in the marriage. See id.
104. The failure of the state criminal justice system to effectively deal with violence against
women, specifically domestic violence, essentially perpetuates the victimization of women. It is
only logical that a woman, who has been abused in her home by an intimate and is hesitant to
seek help, will be discouraged by an unresponsive criminal justice system. Statistics show that
domestic violence victims are likely to be abused repeatedly and the fear of retaliation, coupled
with the view that the system will not help her, only encourages her to remain in the situation.
See Hanna, infra note 113, at 1558-59; Mahoney, infra note 113, at 61-68.
105. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 51 (1993).
106. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 42 (1993).
107. Brenneke, supra note 49, at 36. Violence against women committed by men, especially
domestic violence, is seen as a way of controlling and oppressing all women. See generally Ep-
stein, supra note 15 (discussing failures and reforms in the judicial system).
108. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 51 (1993).
109. Hearn, supra note 86, at 1112 (citing S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (1993)).
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temstt o prevent the existing laws from being adequately and evenly
enforced, especially those concerning domestic violence.111 Congress
specifically found that in many incidents of domestic violence
"[p]olice may refuse to take reports; prosecutors may encourage de-
fendants to plead to minor offenses; judges may rule against victims
on evidentiary matters .... ,,11 This response to domestic violence
cases commonly stems from the misperception of the victim's situation
and the belief that the woman should simply leave her abuser.1 13 In
the rare case where a domestic violence victim's attacker is brought to
justice, it is important to recognize that the "criminal system's reme-
dies and the battered women's needs may not correspond.' 1 4 Title
III was enacted to address this disparity between injury and recovery.
110. See id. See infra notes 159-169 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 40-88 and accompanying text.
112. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (1993). See Hearn, supra note 86, at 1111-12 (citing the same
text).
113. For people who have not experienced violence at the hand of an intimate relation, in-
cluding many of those who handle domestic violence cases, it is difficult to understand why
anyone would remain in a violent situation or relationship. Although many in society have be-
gun to empathize with domestic violence victims, few can understand the reasons why they stay.
Many victims of domestic violence believe that the violence will stop if she stays and tries to
"work it out." Other domestic violence victims might feel there is no place to go or are so
financially dependent on their abuser that there seems to be no way to leave. For example,
Sarah M. Buel, an attorney and activist who was once an abused wife, has created a list of fifty
reasons why abused women feel they cannot leave. Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving,
A.K.A., Why Abuse Victims Stay, 28 CoLo. LAW. 19, 19-26 (1999). These reasons include believ-
ing the threats of the batterer, family pressure to stay together, fear of retaliation, low self es-
teem and fear of losing the children. Id. See Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime
and Punishment of Domestic Violence, WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1558-59 (1998) (stating that
"the most often asked question in these cases is why the woman does not leave," and discussing
the different factors that make women stay); Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 61-68 (1991) (discussing the fact
that women may try to leave an abuser many times before she is actually able to free herself
from a violent situation).
114. Brenneke, supra note 49, at 32. In the Cook County State's Attorney's Office-Domestic
Violence Division, it is clear that most domestic violence defendants plead guilty only to face the
most common punishment of counseling and probation or conditional discharge, rather than
imprisonment. (documents on file with author). Whatever the punishment may be, the victim
may still fear retaliation from either the defendant or his friends or family, many times a protec-
tion order only applies against the defendant. See Jennifer R. Adler, Note, Strengthening Vic-
tims' Rights In Domestic Violence Cases: An Argument For 30-Day Mandatory Restraining
Orders in Massachusetts, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 303, 305 (1999) (arguing that the states should
implement mandatory restraining orders and enforce them if they want to sufficiently protect
victims of domestic violence). Title III provides domestic violence victims with the chance to
recover damages incurred as a result of the abuse, which they cannot recover under state crimi-
nal laws.
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a. The Role of Law Enforcement
The breakdown of the state criminal justice system, as it pertains to
domestic violence, begins when the police do not enforce existing
laws.115 The police represent a state's first line of attack on domestic
violence,116 the power to make arrests. In fact, Congress cited to
many studies showing that, despite evidence that domestic violence
was widespread,1 17 the police officers were not doing their job of pro-
tecting women.118
For instance, one study found that in 1986, police officers for the
District of Columbia responded to over ninety-thousand domestic vio-
lence calls, yet arrested only forty people.119 A similarly drastic statis-
tic may not be apparent in every state, however, it illustrates a serious
problem in the criminal justice system and a lack of support for do-
mestic violence victims after they have called for help. 20
Due to privacy interests, many police officers today still view arrest
as a last resort in domestic violence situations.121 The "private do-
115. See infra notes 116-118 and accompanying text. See Adler, supra note 114, at 311 (dis-
cussing the fact that "[pirior to the 1980s the preferred law enforcement technique in responding
to domestic abuse call was mediation").
116. See Barbara J. Hart, Arrest: What's the Big Deal, 3 WM & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 207, 211
(1997) (noting that "police officers are the gatekeeper of the criminal legal system"). Arrest is
the "first link in a vital chain of institutional interventions that saves.., lives of battered women
and children ..... Id.
117. See VIOLENCE By INTIMATES, supra note 21, at v.
118. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993). Consider the case of Carrie Culberson, who had
called the police at least four times to file reports of the domestic abuse she suffered at the hands
of her boyfriend, Doan. See Culberson, 65 F. Supp.2d at 703. The police never filed charges
against Doan, even though in one instance Carrie required a hospital visit. Id. Carrie disap-
peared one month after her last call to the police; Doan was later convicted of her murder. Id. at
704. The failure of the police to deal with domestic abuse the same way as other violent crimes,
has been acknowledged by members of police departments themselves as recently as 1997. See
Douglas R. Marvin, The Dynamics of Domestic Abuse, Law Enforcement Bulletin (July 1997), at
http://www.fbi.gov/library/leb/1997/july973.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2001). Marvin is a police
lieutenant acknowledging that domestic violence is treated differently than other violent crimes
and calling for more education of police officers so that they are better suited to deal with do-
mestic violence situations. Id.
119. See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27 (1994).
120. See Cain, supra note 48, at 377 (noting that "the legal system has contributed to the
misunderstanding about domestic violence by refusing to offer substantive civil and criminal
remedies to victims of domestic violence").
121. Congress recognized that the home has always been considered a private domain, result-
ing in a habit of violence in the home that is harder to break than anywhere else. S. REP. No.
103-138, at 41 (1993). "This rule, originally intended to protect women from excessive violence,
in fact led to a reluctance on the part of the government to interfere to protect women even
where serious violence occurred." Id. at 41. "Prior to the 1970s, the typical police response to
domestic violence was to mediate the situation. Police advised the husband or boyfriend to 'take
a walk around the block' rather than arrest him." Hanna, supra note 113, at n.48. See Adler,
supra note 114, at n.22 (citing to President Clinton's 1996 address where he acknowledged that
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main"' 22 of the marital relationship, along with the historical view of
domestic violence as a private issue, l2 3 has fostered and encouraged
the police to attempt to help the parties rather than arrest the abus-
ers. 124 It is remarkable that "[e]ven in situations where a woman is
actually bleeding from wounds, arrests occur in less than 15% of these
cases."' 1 5 In an attempt to deal with the privacy issue, most states
have begun to change their discretionary arrest policies.' 2 6
Since the enactment of Title III, all fifty states have enacted legisla-
tion allowing "police officers to make warrantless arrests upon proba-
ble cause that someone committed a domestic violence misdemeanor
or violated a restraining order."'1 27 In fact, as of 1996, most states had
gone further in the fight against domestic violence by implementing
mandatory or preferred arrest policies for domestic violence
situations.12 8
Mandatory arrest policies require police officers to arrest a suspect
when they have probable cause to believe that a domestic violence
assault has occurred. 29 Although these policies may increase the
number of domestic violence arrests, they do not necessarily increase
"domestic violence is an issue that 'has been swept under the rug for quite a long time now."');
Machaela M. Hoctor, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need for Mandatory
Arrest in California, 85 CAL. L. REV. 643, 649 (1997) ("Police treatment of domestic abuse calls
has traditionally consisted of not responding at all, purposely delaying response .... or, when
officers did respond, attempting to talk to or separate the parties so that they could cool off.");
Marvin, supra note 118, at 1 ("[U]ntil fairly recently, police officers rarely ventured into the
private domain of the marital relationship.").
122. Marvin, supra note 118, at 1.
123. Adler, supra note 114, at n.22; Hoctor, supra note 121, at 649-50; Marvin, supra note 118,
at 1.
124. Even more troubling is the failure of police to make an arrest when the victim has a
restraining order on the attacker. Restraining orders, which are available from a civil court if
police have not pursued criminal charges, are the most common request of domestic violence
victims. Many studies have questioned the effectiveness of restraining orders, noting that many
abusers who are subject to an order continue to abuse the victim. For a discussion of the inade-
quacy of restraining orders, see Cain, supra note 48, at 379 (explaining the reasons why protec-
tive orders have failed).
125. Lisa M. Fitzgerald, The Violence Against Women Act: Is It An Effective Solution?, 1 How.
SCROLL 46, 47 (1993).
126. See infra notes 133, 137 and accompanying text.
127. Hanna, supra note 113, at 1518. No longer must the police officer witness the incident, or
condition an arrest of an abuser on the statement of a victim. See infra notes 357-370 and accom-
panying text. These laws give the police much more power in dealing with domestic violence
situations and correspondingly should result in more arrests since the arrest is not dependent on
the victim.
128. See Hanna, supra note 113, at 1518-19. As of 1996, as many as 25 states had mandatory
arrest policies in place. Id. States with preferred-arrest policies encourage officers to arrest, but
do not require that they do so. See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VrO-
LENCE: EXPERIMENTS ANi) DILEMMAS 111, 112 (1992).
129. SHERMAN, supra note 128, at 111.
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the response of the police. For instance, in many states with
mandatory arrest policies, it has been found that if the "abuser is not
present when the police arrive, the police may have no duty to go
after him and investigate.' ' 30
The failure of police officers to make arrests or believe a victim's
story perpetuates the problem of domestic violence 131 by discouraging
victims from calling the police, thereby increasing the risk of repeated
abuse by the attacker. 132 The victim takes a chance when she calls for
help that she will not receive the help she needs, and, even if the po-
lice respond, they are limited in what they can do.133
b. The Problem with Prosecutorial Discretion
In addition to the problem with police response, Congress found
that in the unlikely event that a domestic violence incident resulted in
the arrest of the abuser, the problem of underenforcement continued
at the prosecutorial level. 134 The prosecutor serves as the gatekeeper
to the judicial system, since the discretion as to whether to continue
130. Brenneke, supra note 49, at 34.
131. See supra note 113 (discussing why a domestic violence victim might stay with her
abuser); Fitzgerald, supra note 125, at 48-49 (discussing the problem of women not reporting
domestic violence because of "fear they will not be believed," or "that they will be treated
harshly and disrespectfully by police, judges, or lawyers").
132. See Brenneke, supra note 49, at 34 (describing the lack of arrests when a temporary
restraining order is violated and the likelihood of repeated assaults as a result); David M. Fine,
Note, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: The Proper Federal Role in Policing Domestic
Violence, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 252, 256 (1998) (citing to Bureau of Justice Statistics stating that
"[v]ictims of domestic violence are three times more likely that victims of other assaults to be-
come victims again within six months").
133. In mandatory arrest states, the police can arrest the alleged abuser if the officer has
probable cause, regardless of whether the victim wants to proceed with the charges. See Adler,
supra note 114, at 309 (explaining historical police responses to domestic violence). Beyond
making an arrest, providing the victim with the court information, and possibly testifying in
court, the police have a limited role in providing a victim with relief. Some helpful policemen
and women have provided victims with shelter and counseling information. At the Domestic
Violence Division of the Cook County State's Attorney's Office, a police officer actually pro-
vided a victim with this little bit of advice that he thought would be helpful, which he recorded
on the police report, "I recommend that you get a protective order, get an attorney and find a
more personally fulfilling relationship." (on file with author).
134. See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27 (1993). See also Brenneke, supra note 49, at 30-32
(discussing gender bias in the legal system); Hearn, supra note 86, at 1113 (same). For a discus-
sion on why the civil rights remedy is not needed since the states are handling the problem of
domestic violence, see William G. Bassler, The Federalization of Domestic Violence: An Exercise
in Cooperative Federalism or a Misallocation of Federal Judicial Resources, 48 RUTGERS L. REV.
1139, 1166 (1996) ("Available evidence indicates that state domestic violence laws are not simply
on the books, but are in fact being utilized .... Recent statistics reveal that caseloads have
grown by thirty-eight percent since 1988.").
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with the criminal prosecution usually lies solely in his hands. 135 Once
a victim decides that she will testify against her abuser,136 the prosecu-
tor must then consider whether he wants to litigate the case.137 Con-
gress found many studies showing that prosecutors were often
reluctant to "pursue rape and domestic violence complaints,"' 138 and in
the event that the prosecutor went forward, the "battered women's
experiences were trivialized as 'non-crime' by prosecutors and
judges." 39
Prosecutors consider many factors when deciding whether to liti-
gate a case. Congress found that there were many reasons why a do-
mestic violence case specifically might not be prosecuted. The factors
included, but were not limited to, "victim reluctance or refusal to co-
operate, lack of proper police investigations, prosecutors untrained in
how to proceed without the victim's testimony, and the belief that
these cases were a private family matter. ' 140 In the event that the
victim wanted to press charges, she was still limited by the system be-
cause she could not access the courts unless the prosecutor saw the
case as worthy of pursuing.' 4'
State prosecutors, in many cases, find themselves strapped for time
and funding, as well as juggling many different cases. 142 In the context
of domestic violence cases, this situation created an environment in
135. See Hanna, supra note 113, at n.2 (arguing that prosecutors should retain the control over
whether to proceed with a domestic violence case).
136. In discussing prosecutorial discretion, one must assume that the victim has agreed to
testify in court because without her testimony, the case could be dropped. In interviewing do-
mestic violence victims, the responsibility was often to determine whether the victim was willing
to testify to the alleged event and if not, to let the prosecutor know so that the case could be
dismissed. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 15 (discussing "auto-drop" prosecution policies based
on the belief that convictions could not be attained without victim cooperation and testimony);
Adler, supra note 114, at 309 (discussing the high probability that a case will be to weak to
prosecute if the victim does not testify). This is true unless the state has a "no-drop" policy. See
infra notes 395-429 and accompanying text.
137. See Hanna, supra note 113, at 1520-21.
138. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27 (1993) (internal citations omitted) (listing reasons for lack
of prosecution of alleged abusers).
139. Brenneke, supra note 49, at 30-31 (quoting NICOLE RAFTER & ELIZABETH STANKO,
JUDGE, LAWYER, VICTIM, THIEF: WOMEN, GENDER ROLES, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1982) (dis-
cussing the role stereotypes of female domestic violence victims played in criminal justice in the
early 1980s)).
140. Id.
141. See Brenneke, supra note 49, at 32 (discussing criminal prosecutions of domestic violence
noting that "[t]he power and control of the state replaces that of the batterer in a criminal prose-
cution and may perpetuate battered women's experience of victimization").
142. Working in the Domestic Violence Division of the Cook County State's Attorney's Of-
fice this author noticed that all of the prosecutors single-handedly dealt with over thirty domestic
violence victims every day and made less in salary than the public defenders assigned to re-
present the batterers. Although funding seems to be tight in most domestic violence court-
[Vol. 50:919
2001] LOSE THE BATTLE AND WIN THE WAR?
which many cases were dropped because the prosecutor had no time
to investigate the charges or speak to the victim at length. In the cases
where the victim wanted to go forward with the charges, 143 credibility
of the victim often became the primary consideration in the decision
to pursue the case. As a result, prosecutors would often find them-
selves dealing with a victim who told a story of brutality without emo-
tion,1 44 causing the prosecutor to question the credibility of the victim
and her situation. 145 Congress noted that when a woman reported a
violent attack at the hands of a man, many times the prosecutor would
view her story with suspicion and believe that she had an ulterior mo-
tive or that she might not be telling the truth.1 46 The prosecutor's
actions of dropping a case would result in the victim feeling as though
she could not be helped and, beyond telling her story, that she had no
say in the outcome of the case. 47
In the event that the prosecutor decided to go forward with the
prosecution, it was unlikely that the case would ever reach trial. 48
rooms, it is getting better. For a discussion of the increased funding options available through
the VAWA 1, see infra notes 454-485 and accompanying text.
143. Historically, most states had "automatic drop" policies, mandating a prosecutor drop the
case if the victim decided not to go forward. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 15 (discussing "auto-
matic drop policies and the corresponding control they gave defendants over the criminal justice
process).
144. See infra notes 346-351 and accompanying text (discussing Battered Women's
Syndrome).
145. See infra notes 346-351 (noting the persistent and pervasive view that women's stories
about domestic violence generally are not considered credible).
146. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 44 (1991) (noting the circular dilemma inherent in the suspi-
cion that the victim's story might not be true deters many prosecutors from going forward with
cases and in turn, prevents many victims from reporting abuse). Although rare, some purported
victims of domestic violence have come forward, not because of the crime committed, but rather
to get back at their boyfriend/husband for infidelity or for filing for divorce. This is a problem in
any legal situation, but especially in domestic violence cases, when it is usually one party's word
against the other's and many times there is no physical evidence of abuse.
147. This is especially true when a defendant pleads guilty. A large number of domestic vio-
lence cases never actually reach the courtroom; most defendants plead guilty and receive only a
slap on the wrist. See supra note 114; infra note 159 and accompanying text (stating that stran-
gers receive harsher penalties than abusers who are intimate with their victims).
148. Domestic violence crimes are most commonly prosecuted as misdemeanors and accord-
ingly, most defendants plead guilty rather than spend the time and money to go to trial. See
Hanna, supra note 113, at 1521 (noting that "[o]f those cases that are prosecuted, many are
charged or pled down to misdemeanors despite facts that suggest the conduct constituted a fel-
ony"); Guns and Domestic Violence Change to Ownership Ban: Hearings on H.R. 26 and 445
Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. (1997), available at 1997 WL 8219577 (statement of Donna F. Edwards, Executive Direc-
tor, National Network to End Domestic Violence) (finding that "to the extent criminal charges
result from a domestic violence incident, it is likely to be charged and prosecuted as a misde-
meanor crime"). During the summer of 1999, in one Cook County domestic violence courtroom,
an average of thirty-five misdemeanor cases were tried each day. Typically, the Assistant State's
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Congress found that the final disposition of a domestic violence case
was "often a period of probation either pre- or postconviction, contin-
gent upon completion of a batterer treatment program. '' 149 Accord-
ingly, in this type of environment the victim remained powerless
because "[t]he power and control of the state replace[d] that of the
batterer . . . [and] perpetuate[d] battered women's experience of
victimization."°150
c. Gender Bias in the Judicial System
Congress also found that a victim of domestic violence, who was
willing to testify against her abuser and who found a prosecutor will-
ing to litigate her case, faced further gender bias in the judicial sys-
tem.151 Congress cited several state studies documenting the effects
gender bias in the courts had on women,152 finding specifically that
"cases involving domestic violence [were] regarded [by judges] as triv-
ial or unimportant."153
Congress looked beyond the statistics to examine the actual situa-
tions where judicial bias was obvious. 154 Congress found stories of
judges who stated outright that they did not believe the victim or who
mocked the victim and her story. For example, former prosecutor
Deborah Epstein related one of her client's stories, a victim of domes-
tic violence who attempted to press charges against her husband. At
the conclusion of the trial, the judge turned to the victim, who still
suffered a blue and swollen eye and stated:
Ma'am, I credit your testimony, and I am convinced your husband
assaulted you in violation of the law. As a result, I am authorized to
award you a civil protection order, which could order him to stay
away from you and stop hurting you. But I am not going to do that
Attorneys assigned to the courtroom prepared for trial in less than five percent of the cases and
argued even fewer. (material on file with author).
149. Hanna, supra note 113, at 1522. Requiring the abuser to attend counseling has become
the preferred way of punishment in courts around the country. Even when a batterer is con-
victed of a serious offense "few batterers ever see the inside of a jail cell." Id. at 1523. Unfortu-
nately, treatment does not work for many abusers and many times it gives the victim hope that
her abuser is rehabilitated and encourages her to stay. See id. at 1536.
150. Brenneke, supra note 49, at 32.
151. See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27-28 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197 (1991). This is a major
concern because the judicial system hears the case, decides the merits, hands out the punish-
ment, and is essentially the main component of the criminal justice system that can actually
prevent further violence. See generally Adler, supra note 114; Epstein, supra note 15. For a
discussion of the movement to make judicial education and training a priority in combating
domestic violence, see infra Part 1II.B.l.c.
152. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 38 (1991).
153. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 37 (1993).
154. See id.
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today. Because you have children together, you're going to have to
find some way to cooperate with each other to raise them. So, I
want you to go home and try to work things out in private. And I
suggest that you go see a movie I saw recently. "Mrs. Doubtfire,"
where Robin Williams and his wife decide to separate, but still man-
age to find a creative way to work together when it came to their
children.155
The gender bias was just as clear in another case where "[a] state
judge jailed a rape victim when the victim recanted her prior accusa-
tion because she felt pressure from her ex-boyfriend and his family
who were in the courtroom." 156 These examples, coupled with the
gender bias studies, further supported the conclusion that gender bias
exists in most state judicial systems.15 7
The gender bias in the judicial system became even more apparent
when cases of domestic violence, cases where there was a relationship
between the victim and the abuser, were compared with cases of as-
sault or battery by a stranger.1 58 Assault committed by a stranger had
traditionally been treated as a serious criminal offense that should
yield a serious jail term159 as the normal outcome of such a case. Yet,
when the assault was perpetrated on a wife or girlfriend, the punish-
ment rarely included jail time. 160 Furthermore, Congress noted that in
most states domestic violence crimes, regardless of the severity, quali-
fied as misdemeanors.16' As a result, abuse that would qualify as a
felony when performed against a stranger would merely result in a
155. Epstein, supra note 15, at 6-7.
156. Hearn, supra note 86, at 1113 (emphasis in original).
157. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49 (1993). See Cain, supra note 48, at 380 (noting that the
average prison sentence for women who kill their abusers is between twelve and sixteen years,
while men who kill their significant others only serve between two to six years, "illustrating the
inequity women face in the legal system"); Mabbun, supra note 28, at 221 (discussing the fact
that Congress was responding to the bias in the judicial system when it enacted Title III).
158. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 40 (1990).
159. Id. See Leonore M.J. Simon, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to the Legal Reason-
ing of Domestic Violence Cases, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 43, 74 (1995) (finding that most
research indicates that "stranger offenders fare worse than nonstranger offenders in sentencing
outcome").
160. See Domestic Violence Hearing: Not Just a Family Matter: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 2 (1994) (state-
ment of Rep. Charles E. Schumer) ("According to one study, as many as 90 percent of all family
violence defendants are never prosecuted, and one-third of the cases that would be considered
felonies if committed by strangers are charged as misdemeanors when committed by
nonstrangers.").
161. A "misdemeanor" refers to a "class of criminal offenses consisting of those offenses less
serious than felonies and which are sanctioned by less severe penalties." BARRON'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 319 (3d ed. 1996). See also BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1150 (4th ed.) (defining misde-
meanors as "offenses lower than felonies and generally those punishable by fine or
imprisonment otherwise than in penitentiary").
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misdemeanor, qualifying for less than a year in jail, when perpetrated
against a wife or girlfriend.
The problem of gender bias in the judicial system was so wide-
spread that it was recognized by integral members 62 of state criminal
justice systems.' 63 The pervasiveness of the problem was illustrated
through testimony at the 1990 hearings on the VAWA I. During the
hearings, an Assistant District Attorney from Massachusetts testified
about the difficulty of prosecuting and obtaining a conviction in a rape
case where the two parties had a relationship, stating:
I can try two cases back-to-back. If it is a stranger assault, I have no
trouble getting the maximum, absolutely none. I get the married
couple in there and the judge wants to talk about, "'Now, are you
sure you don't want to go to marriage counseling ... and just com-
plete denial about her danger. I am terrified for her life, and the
judge wants to talk about this illusion of mom, pop, bud, sis, and
dog Spot . . . .1164
The judiciary not only treated the victims and defendants of domestic
violence cases differently, but also applied different standards to do-
mestic violence cases. 165
The disparate standards applied to domestic violence cases become
clear when the treatment of domestic violence victims is examined in
comparison to victims of other crimes. Contrary to other cases, such
as drug cases, 166 "a perpetrator's threats to the victim [in domestic
violence cases], before trial often go unpunished.' 67 This is true de-
spite the fact that domestic violence cases often require the coopera-
tion of the victim in order to fully prosecute the perpetrator, 168 while
162. "Integral members" include police departments, prosecutors, court systems, and the leg-
islatures. See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text (discussing gender bias in the judicial
system).
163. See Hanna, supra note 113, at 1508 (noting that as a "former prosecutor" she was "con-
tinually frustrated with the unwillingness of judges to sentence domestic violence offenders to
incarceration, opting most often for batterer treatment as a condition of probation").
164. Nourse, supra note 47, at 11 (citing Women and Violence: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 163-64 (1990) (testimony of Sarah M. Buel)); Hearn, supra
note 86, at 1113.
165. Courts are much more likely to accept a guilty plea and a recommended sentence that
lacks jail time in a domestic violence case. See supra notes 114, 159-161.
166. See Hanna, supra note 113, at 1509-10 (noting that "sentencing of other crimes, particu-
larly . . . drug offenses, receives enormous attention"). See e.g. David A. Sklansky, Cocaine,
Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1283-85 (1995); Margaret P. Spencer, Sen-
tencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction, 40 VILL. L. REV. 335, 343-56, 372-81
(1995).
167. See Nourse, supra note 47, at 10 n.57; Hearn, supra note 86, at 1113 (discussing discrep-
ancies in attitudes toward domestic abuse and other crimes).
168. See supra notes 136, 143 and accompanying text.
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cases involving other crimes, such as drug cases, are normally prose-
cuted by the state regardless of victim or witness participation. 169
Additionally, sentencing in domestic violence cases is treated much
differently than other types of crimes.170 For example, if the abuser in
a domestic violence case pled guilty or was found guilty, he would
most likely be sentenced to probation conditioned with domestic vio-
lence counseling.171 In comparison to the sentencing of other crimes,
such as drug cases,172 "preferring treatment to incarceration for do-
mestic violence looks like lingering sexism. ' 173 As a result of the dif-
ferent treatment and sentencing that domestic violence cases received,
the state criminal law system appeared to prefer the abuser's well-
being to that of the victim.1 74 Thus, Title III represented an attempt
to remedy this longstanding disparity in the treatment of victims of
gender motivated violence, including domestic violence. 75
2. Existing Federal Legislation as Inadequate
Congress enacted Title III in response to not only the underenforce-
ment of state laws, but also the lack of federal legislation addressing
169. Traditionally acts qualifying as criminal, such as drug possession, are considered crimes
against the state. See Nourse, supra note 47, at 10-11; Hearn, supra note 86, at 1113 (discussing
treatment of domestic violence crimes in contrast to other criminal acts).
170. See supra notes 159-166. A dramatic disparity exists between sentencing in drug cases
and domestic violence cases. See Hanna, supra note 113, at 1541-42 (noting that "[t]he reasons
for disparity in sentencing between offenses involving violence against women and illegal sub-
stances are indeed many, but we should not ignore the implicit value judgement about which
offenses constitute the greater social harm"); Epstein, supra note 15, at n.ll (noting that special-
ized drug courtrooms were created long before domestic violence courtrooms).
171. See Hanna, supra note 113, at 1508.
172. Stopping drug use has become an American obsession over the last twenty years, result-
ing in nationwide education campaigns and aggressive legal reforms. See NAT'L CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE COMM'N, THE REAL WAR ON CRIME 14-16 (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996) (listing the
significant anti-crime legislation since 1980). As a result, legislation such as "three strikes and
you're out" has been enacted. See generally Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to
Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395 (1997) (discussing "three strikes" legislation in
California). Logically, because of the high-profile drug cases, most prosecutors find it a privilege
to be asked to chair a drug case. On the other hand, domestic violence prosecutors were usually
only involved in domestic violence cases because they were assigned. Traditionally, many prose-
cutors have felt that dealing with the domestic violence cases should be the job of young and
inexperienced attorneys, finding it something of a punishment to be required to rotate through
domestic violence. See Swent, infra note 368, at 55-59 (reviewing obstacles faced by women in
domestic violence cases).
173. Hanna, supra note 113, at 1542.
174. See Marvin, supra note 118, at 2. Domestic violence victims do not receive counseling or
financial assistance from the criminal system, yet the convicted abuser receives treatment that he
would not be able to afford on his own. "When the final outcome in a criminal case is treatment
[for the abuser], the offender gains many benefits and suffers few consequences." Hanna, supra
note 113, at 1544.
175. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 41 (1990).
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the issue of violence against women.1 76 Title III filled a prominent
gap in existing federal legislation addressing civil rights. 77 Prior to
the enactment of Title III, civil remedies existed for violent discrimi-
nation because of race, 78 religion, 79 political beliefs, 180 and gender-
motivated "crimes committed in the workplace, 181 but not for gender
crimes committed on the street or in the home."' 82 As a result, in the
area of domestic violence, Title III went where no approach had gone
before, by establishing a woman's right to be free from violence and
characterizing domestic violence as a public rather than a private
harm, while at the same time allowing individual victims recovery of
damages. 83 It was "an approach designed to achieve what the main-
stream legal doctrine of sex discrimination ha[d] been 'utterly ineffec-
tive at getting women'- namely 'a chance at productive lives of
reasonable physical security, self-expression, individuation, and mini-
mal respect and dignity."' 184
Although Title III was modeled after the already existing statutes
contained within Chapter 42 United States Code sections 1981, 1982,
1983, and 1985(3),185 Congress recognized that these statutes failed to
address gender-motivated violence, and designed Title III to address
176. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 43 (1991).
177. See id.
178. There have been many federal laws enacted to remedy violent discrimination based on
race, including: 42 United States Code sections 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985(3), Title VII and
Federal Hate Crimes Statistics and Reporting Act (28 U.S.C. § 534 (1994)). After ratification of
the Thirteenth Amendment, 42 United States Code sections 1981 and 1982 were enacted to deal
with both private and government acts of race discrimination in making and enforcing contracts
and owning and selling property. See Brenneke, supra note 49, at 45.
179. Violent crimes that are based on prejudice due to the victim's religious beliefs are recog-
nized as hate crimes and therefore punishable under The Federal Hate Crimes Statistics Act of
1990. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1994). The Act recognizes crimes based on religion as hate crimes by
providing for the acquisition and publication of data about crimes that manifest evidence of
prejudice based on religion. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (b)(3) (1994).
180. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 42 (1991) (Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on
the Violence Against Women Act of 1991). See Brenneke, supra note 49, at 54 (discussing legis-
lation passed to protect people from discrimination based on political beliefs, but not gender-
motivated violence).
181. 42 United States Code section 2000e (Title VII) provides a mechanism to eradicate dis-
crimination against women and minorities in the employment context. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701
et seq., 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1992)). Title VII provides
a valuable tool that reaches private actors in their acts of sex discrimination in the workplace,
provides a remedy for the individual victim, and has a deterrent value. See Brenneke, supra note
49, at 51.
182. S. REP. No. 103-11 (1993).
183. See Brenneke, supra note 49, at 29 (discussing civil rights remedies). See also supra note
28 (citing articles that analyze Title Ill).
184. See Brenneke, supra note 49, at 8 (quoting Catharine MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE ANI) LAW 133 (1987)).
185. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 51 (1993); S. REP. No. 101-545, at 57 (1990).
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that need. 86 Congress explicitly stated that Title III was "in no way
intended to undermine existing civil rights protections"'187 or to "re-
vise or broaden"1 88 the already existing statutes. Rather, the intent
behind Title III was to address problems not already covered by other
federal legislation.' 18 9 Accordingly, Title III represented "a national
186. 42 United States Code sections 1981 and 1982 were enacted to provide remedies for
racial discrimination and not to address gender-motivated violence. See Brenneke, supra note
49, at 45-46. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)) provides a guar-
antee to "all persons ... the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994). With the Civil Rights Act of 1991, section 1981
protections extend to the performance and modification of the contracts. Section 1982 provides:
"All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994).
42 United States Code section 1983 provides a private civil rights cause of action for individu-
als deprived, "under color of" law, of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The central limitation of the section 1983 remedy
for battered women is that only those acting "under color" of law can be held accountable for
deprivation caused to the victim, and even that use has been limited by the Supreme Court. See
DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989) (holding that "a
State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause"). See also Hearn, supra note 86, at 1104 (discussing the Civil
Rights remedy). Accordingly, section 1983 may be used by battered women or victims of gen-
der-motivated violence against municipalities and police departments for failure to protect their
constitutional rights, but cannot be used by most battered women or victims of violent crime to
obtain justice for the abuse they have suffered. See Brenneke, supra note 49, at 47 (explaining
the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1992)).
42 United States Code section 1985(3) does not extend to gender-motivated violence by a
private individual, unless it involves a conspiracy. Section 1985(3) of Chapter 42 of the United
States Code provides a cause of action against private individuals who conspire "for the purpose
of depriving ... any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (3) (1994). The legislative history
of the VAWA I stresses the distinction between criminal prosecutions and civil rights remedies,
namely that "[wihile traditional criminal charges ... focus on the harm to the individual, a civil
rights claim redresses an assault on a commonly shared ideal of equality." S. REP. No. 102-197,
at 49 (1991). The Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the statute in Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic has made it nearly impossible for victims of gender-motivated violence to
succeed in a cause of action charging private conspiracies. See 506 U.S. 263, 275-77 (1993). In
Bray, the Supreme Court held that interference with the claimant's underlying right must be a
conscious, intentional objective of the enterprise, and that the conspirators must "act at least in
part for the purpose of producing" deprivation of the right. Id. at 276.
187. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 53 (1993).
188. Id.
189. For a discussion of why 42 United States Code sections 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985(3) are
not applicable to gender-motivated violence, see supra notes 172, 180. Title VII provides a
mechanism to eradicate discrimination against women and minorities in employment, but is not
designed for use against private individuals outside the scope of employment. Title VII provides
a valuable tool that reaches private actors in their acts of sex discrimination, but because it
addresses the employer/employee context, it does not provide a civil right to be free from gen-
der-motivated violence. It is important to note that Congress recognized Title Vtt's failure to
protect women outside the scope of employment, but acknowledged Title VII's value by model-
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commitment to condemn crimes motivated by gender in just the same
way that ... [the federal government had] made a national commit-
ment to condemn crimes motivated by race or religion."'190
Before Title III, the federal statutes that provided legal avenues for
women who suffered discrimination on the basis of sex did so only in
isolated contexts.' 9' Congress recognized this occurrence as a prob-
lem, questioning why a civil right to be free from gender discrimina-
tion existed in the workplace, but not on the street or in the home. 192
Title III addressed the lack of federal legislation, which could provide
"relief for gender-motivated deprivations of civil rights,"1193 along with
the inadequacy of the state criminal legal system.1 94 Title III was en-
acted to address the weaknesses in the fight against gender-motivated
violence, yet despite the extensive hearings and worthy policy objec-
tives, it could not escape constitutional scrutiny.
B. The Debate Over Title III's Constitutionality
Immediately after the enactement of Title III, the question of
whether Congress exceeded its constitutional authority became the
subject of controversy among commentators and legal scholars.195 In
ing Title III after Title VII. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 27 (1991) (stating that "[clurrent law
provides a civil rights remedy for gender crimes committed in the workplace, but not for gender
crimes committed on the street or in the home ...."). Title VII, like Title III of the VAWA I,
provides for a remedy for the individual victim and has deterrent value.
Women who are victims of gender-motivated violence are not considered to be victims of hate
crimes, due to the fact that the Hate Crimes Statistics and Reporting Act does not define crimes
of gender bias as hate crimes. Id. See U.S. HATE CRIMES: Definitions, information and legis-
lation, Hate Crimes Legislation, at http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom hatl.htm (last visited
Feb. 20, 2001) (discussing four different definitions of what constitutes a "hate crime"). The Act
provides for the acquisition and publication of data about crimes that manifest evidence of
prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, and explicitly does not create a
cause of action or a right to bring an action for discrimination. Federal Hate Crimes Statistics
and Reporting Act, the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 534 (1992)). For more discussion of the specifics of the Hate Crimes Statistics Act see
Brenneke, supra note 49, at 52. See generally Joseph M. Fernandez, Recent Development, Bring-
ing Hate Crimes Into Focus, 26 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 261 (1991) (discussing the need for hate
crime legislation). Title III was enacted specifically with federal legislation that excludes gender
as a protected class in mind. For a discussion about the possibility of including gender in the Act
and recognizing gender-motivated violence as hate crimes, see Diane L. Rosenfeld, When Hate
Crimes Are Based on Gender, Violence Against Women Act News, U.S.D.O.J. 3 (February/
March 1998).
190. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 41 (1990).
191. See Brenneke, supra note 49, at 45. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 48 (1990).
192. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 35 (1991).
193. Brenneke, supra note 49, at 46 (discussing inadequacy of prior legislation to protect the
rights of battered women). See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 65 (1993) (discussing civil rights remedies
provided by Title III).
194. See supra Part II.A.1.
195. See supra notes 28, 30 and accompanying text.
LOSE THE BATTLE AND WIN THE WAR?
addition, Title III faced six constitutional challenges between 1994 and
1998.196 In 1998, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals became the first
federal appellate court to consider Title III when it heard Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University.197 In 1999, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided Brzonkala, and held that by enact-
ing Title III, Congress had exceeded its powers under the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. 198 As a result of this deci-
sion, Brzonkala appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari in 1999 under United States v. Morrison,199 in order
to decide the constitutionality of Title III.
1. The Brzonkala Decision
In January of 2000, the Supreme Court heard arguments in the Mor-
rison case. In May of 2000, a much-divided Supreme Court 200 de-
clared that Congress, by enacting Title III, had overreached its powers
granted by both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 20 1 Although limited by the constitutional issue of Title III, the
Court recognized the social significance of fighting gender-motivated
crime, as evidenced by the Court's recitation of the facts of the case, 202
its comments about the severity of the crime, 20 3 and its concern that
the state had not punished the perpetrator.20 4 In order to examine the
future of Title III, the facts and decision of Morrison require a brief
discussion.
196. See supra note 62.
197. 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nor U.S. v. Morrison, 527 U.S. 1068
(1999), affd U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
198. Id. at 826.
199. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
200. Id. Morrison, similar to most decisions in the 2000 term, was a five to four decision with
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony
Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas voting together as the majority. Id. See e.g. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Wisc. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000); Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). The swing vote came from Justice O'Connor, who was
faced with the state rights versus gender rights issue and decided in favor of state rights. Morri-
son, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). Accordingly, the four dissenters were Justices John Paul Stevens,
David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. Id.
201. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1759.
202. Id. at 1745-47.
203. Id. at 1759. The Court specifically noted that "[i]f the allegations here are true, no civi-
lized system of justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of respondent
Morrison." Id.
204. Id.
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a. The Facts of United States v. Morrison
In September of 1994, a few weeks after beginning her freshman
year at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Christy Brzonkala was gang-
raped in her dorm room by two members of the school's football
team.205 Fearful of retaliation and unable to name her attackers,
Christy did not begin legal action until seven months later, when it
was too late to collect the physical evidence necessary to pursue crimi-
nal charges.206 Although one of the men eventually admitted to the
crime, a judicial committee at the Institute refrained from punishing
the attackers.20 7
In 1996, Brzonkala filed an amended complaint in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia, alleging that her
right under Title III of the VAWA I to be free from gender-motivated
violence had been violated.20 8 After the District Court dismissed her
complaint on constitutional grounds,20 9 Brzonkala appealed to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. As a result, in 1997, the court, in an
opinion by Judge Diana Motz, reversed the district court's opinion,
and held that Title III was well within Congress' powers under the
Commerce Clause.210
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals then decided to reconsider the
case en banc in early 1998.211 Thus, in May of 1999, the court released
a lengthy opinion, agreeing with the district court that Title III was an
unconstitutional exercise of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. 212 As a result, Brzonkala ap-
pealed her case to the United States Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari in September of 1999.
205. Id. at 1745-46.
206. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University, 935 F. Supp. 772, 773-74 (W.D.
Va. 1996). Brzonkala, in testimony before the House Economic and Educational Opportunity
Committee, explained that after the rape "all [she] wanted to do was forget about it." The Open
Campus Police Logs Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 2416 Before the House Comm. on Econ. &
Educ. Opportunity, 104th Cong. 259 (1996) (testimony of Christy Brzonkala). She told no one
about what happened to her until a couple weeks later, after a failed suicide attempt. See id.
207. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1746 (discussing the facts of the case and the failure of the school
to actually punish either of the alleged rapists).
208. See id.
209. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), on appeal 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted sub nom U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 1068 (1999). The district court based its decision on
the same constitutional principles, as did the Supreme Court in 2000. See infra notes 221-257
and accompanying text.
210. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
211. Id.
212. See id.
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b. United States v. Morrison and the Death of Title III
On May 15, 2000, the United States Supreme Court decided
Brzonkala's appeal under the name United States v. Morrison.213 In
Morrison, the Court decided the fate of Title III by holding that it
could not be sustained under either the Commerce Clause2 14 or sec-
tion five of the Fourteenth Amendment.215 Despite its lengthy review
of the facts of Brzonkala's case, 216 and the congressional record ac-
companying the enactment of Title 111,217 the Court agreed with the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' reasoning in Brzonkala.218 The
Court found that Title III did not satisfy the Commerce Clause frame-
work established in Lopez.219 In addition, the Court held that Title III
was not permissible under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment
because it was an overbroad statute directed at private conduct.220
c. Commerce Clause Analysis in Light of United States v. Lopez
Similar to many constitutional principles, the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the Commerce Clause "has changed as our Nation has
developed. '221 In Morrison, the Court recognized this evolving inter-
pretation noting that as the modern interpretations of the Commerce
Clause have become more expansive, 222 so to has the latitude given to
Congress "in regulating conduct and transactions under the Com-
merce Clause. 22 3 Yet, despite this wide latitude given to Congress,
the Court emphasized that "Congress' regulatory authority [was] not
213. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
214. Id. at 1754-55.
215. Id. at 1759.
216. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1745-47.
217. Id. at 1751-53.
218. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding in an en banc opinion that Title III is
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment).
219. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the Court had found that "the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 .... which had made it a federal crime to knowingly possess
a firearm in a school zone, exceeded Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause." Id. at
551.
220. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1754-59.
221. Id. at 1748. See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-57 (discussing the evolution of Commerce
Clause interpretation).
222. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1748. Specifically the Court recognized that "in the years since
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., Congress has had considerably greater latitude in regu-
lating conduct and transactions under the Commerce Clause than our previous case law permit-
ted." Id. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-57 (discussing the evolution of Commerce Clause
interpretation).
223. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1748.
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without effective bounds" 224 and went on to analyze the enactment of
Title III under the Commerce Clause.
The Court began its analysis of Title III by noting that although
there are "three broad categories of activity that Congress may regu-
late under its commerce power, '225 Title III could only be analyzed
under the third category, "as a regulation of activity that substantially
affected interstate commerce. '226 The Court specifically noted that
"[g]iven [Title III's] focus on gender-motivated violence wherever it
occurs (rather than violence directed at the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, interstate markets, or things or persons in interstate
commerce)," 227 the proper inquiry was whether gender-motivated vio-
lence substantially affected interstate commerce. 228 As a result, the
Court analyzed Title III according to the principles in Lopez.229
The Court in Morrison stated that Lopez provided the "proper
framework for conducting the required analysis" of Title III since the
Lopez decision had "canvassed and clarified our case law governing
this third category of Commerce Clause regulations. '230 The Court
then took the opportunity to clarify the Lopez framework by specifi-
cally considering four different factors in deciding whether gender-
motivated violence substantially affected interstate commerce.23'
The first factor that the Court considered was whether Title III reg-
ulated activity that was economic in nature.2 32 The Court found that
although there was no categorical requirement that the activity be ec-
onomic, it had never upheld "Commerce Clause regulation of intra-
state activity" where the activity was not economic in nature. 233
Similar to the possession of a firearm in a school zone, as explained in
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1749 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558). These three categories, as identified by the
Court include: the use of channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce and activities having a substantial relation to interestate commerce. Id. See Lopez,
514 U.S. at 558-59 (identifying the three broad categories of regulation under the Commerce
Clause).
226. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1749. The Court noted that the petitioners did not attempt to
claim that Title III could fall into either of the other two categories. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1749 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551).
230. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1749.
231. Id. at 1749-54. The Court made it clear that the factors it considered in the analysis of
Title Ill were to be applied to any regulation that purported to be a regulation of an activity that
substantially affected interstate commerce. Id. at 1751.
232. Id.
233. Id. The Court noted that if it were to allow Congress to regulate noneconomic activities
based on the aggregate effects of the activity on "national productivity," Congress could effec-
tively regulate any activity. Id.
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Lopez, the Court found that "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence
[were] not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity. '234 Accord-
ingly, the Court held that the first factor weighed against Congress'
authority to pass Title 111.235
In addition, the Court examined the second factor in Lopez, as to
whether Title III contained a jurisdictional element which might es-
tablish that the federal cause of action it provided was in pursuance of
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. 236 The Court ex-
plained that although satisfaction of the jurisdictional element was not
required for Title III to be valid under the Commerce Clause, it
"would lend support to the argument that [Title III was] sufficiently
tied to interstate commerce" to withstand a Commerce Clause chal-
lenge. 237 The Court found that Title III, like the Gun-Free School
Zones Act at issue in Lopez, contained no jurisdictional element since
"Congress elected to cast [Title Ill's] remedy over a wider, and more
purely intrastate, body of violent crime. 238
With the first and second factors weighing against Congress' author-
ity to pass Title III, the Court went on to examine the third factor,
whether Congress had supported the enactment of Title III with find-
ings detailing the need for the regulation. 239 The Court recognized
that unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez, which had no
congressional findings to support it, Title III was supported by "nu-
merous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated
violence ha[d] on victims and their families. ' 240 In regard to the Title
III findings, the Court explained that although the congressional find-
ings were helpful in the analysis, the mere presence of them was "not
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality" of Title III or any
other Commerce Clause legislation.241 In holding that the congres-
sional findings did not strengthen the argument for Title III, the Court
234. Id. The Court in Lopez stated that "[s]ection 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms
has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic activity, however broadly one might
define those terms." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
235. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751.
236. Id. at 1751-52.
237. Id.
238. Id. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62 (stating that "[section] 922(q) has no express jurisdic-
tional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that addition-
ally have explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce").
239. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752.
240. Id. In Lopez, the Court indicated that although formal congressional findings are not
required, such findings may "enable [the Court] to evaluate the legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce... [and such findings] are lacking
here." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63.
241. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752.
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reiterated the fact that "[s]imply because Congress [might] conclude
that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does
not necessarily make it so."'242
The fourth factor considered by the Court in analyzing Title III
under the Commerce Clause was whether Title III would potentially
"obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local
authority .... ,243 The Court argued that if Congress were allowed to
enact legislation similar to Title III, legislation that addressed violent
crime, an area of law traditionally regulated by states, then it could
further expand its legislative scope to regulate other state areas such
as divorce and childrearing.2 44 The Court supported this argument by
noting that Congress had recognized this danger when it had gone to
the trouble of "expressly preclud[ing] [Title III] from being used in the
family law context. ' 245 The Court considered not only the federalsim
concerns of Title III, but also the noneconomic nature and absence of
a jurisdictional element, when it held that Title III could not be upheld
under the Commerce Clause. 246 Accordingly, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of Title III under Congress' remedial power under
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 247
d. Fourteenth Amendment Analysis
Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in part that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privilieges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
242. Id. (internal citations omitted).
243. Id. This concern for state rights has been a divisive issue for the Supreme Court since the
Lopez decision. In fact, the five to four split on the Court often seems to depend on the differ-
ent Justices' views on federalism. See generally id. (discussing the jurisprudence of the Rehn-
quist Court and noting that in many issues, including those involving state rights, often one
Justice is the decisive vote). In the Morrison decision, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, commonly
known as the "swing voter" on the current Court, was forced to decide between two issues she
has supported throughout the years: women's rights and state rights. See Patrick Tracey,
Christy's Crusade, Ms., April/May 2000, at 53 (detailing Brzonkala's story fight to the Supreme
Court, while noting that "[a]ll eyes are on Justice ... O'Connor, one of the two critical swing
votes.., who has been a staunch defender of women's rights, [who] now questions the wisdom
of treading on the traditional right of the states to prosecute rape charges"). It is clear by the
Morrison holding that Justice O'Connor came down on the side of state rights in this case; she
joined the opinion of the majority. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
244. Id. at 1753.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1751-54.
247. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1754-55. The Court stated that "Section 5 [of the Fourteenth
Amendment] states that Congress may 'enforce,' by 'appropriate legislation' the constitutional
guarantee [under the Fourteenth Amendment] that no State shall deprive any person of 'life,
liberty or property, without due process of law,' nor deny any person 'equal protection of the
laws."' Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997)).
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any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.248
The duty of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment belongs to Con-
gress. According to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
"Congress shall have [the] power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]. '" 249 Although
the Constitution grants Congress this remedial power, the Supreme
Court has limited this power by holding that the "language and pur-
pose of the Fourteenth Amendment place certain limitations on the
manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct. '250
When Congress enacted Title III, it "expressly invoked the Four-
teenth Amendment as a source of authority. 125' As a result, the
Court in Morrison analyzed Title III's constitutionality under the
Fourteenth Amendment and found that it was an invalid exercise of
Congress' remedial powers.2 52 Furthermore, in addressing Title III
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court acknowledged that
"[the principles governing an analysis of congressional legislation
under [section five] are well settled. 2 53 The Court reviewed its Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence, and specifically found that Con-
gress' remedial powers could only be used to prohibit discriminatory
state action. 254 In addressing the claim that Title III was enacted to
remedy "pervasive bias in various state justice systems against victims
of gender-motivated violence,"2 55 the Court found that Title III was
not directed "[a]t any State or state actor, but at individuals who have
committed criminal acts motivated by gender. ' 256 As a result, the
Court held that Title III could not be valid under the Fourteenth
Amendment.257
248. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
249. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
250. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1755.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1758-59.
253. Id. at 1755.
254. Id. The Court stressed that the limitations on Congress under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment were "necessary to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers'
carefully crafted balance of power between the States and the National Government." Id.
255. Id.
256. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1758.
257. Id. at 1759.
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2. The Aftermath of United States v. Morrison
Although the Court's decision in Morrison acknowledged that Title
III addressed a national problem, 258 the Court failed to provide Con-
gress with any guidance as to the appropriate means for addressing
the problem after the death of Title III. Accordingly, if Congress
wants to continue its search for a solution that will address the prob-
lem of remedies for victims of gender-motivated violence, it will now
need to consider alternative avenues. 259 A consideration of the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of Title III, as it existed, supports the need
for the nation to address the problem of gender-motivated violence,
however, as a result of the Court's holding, now the nation must con-
sider alternatives to Title III.
C. Was Title III Worth Saving?
The debate over Title III centered on the question of whether it
would survive constitutional scrutiny, overshadowing the important
social and policy aspects of Title 111.260 The issue of constitutionality
did not question whether Title III was needed, but rather the method
by which it was enacted and whether the federal government was in-
fringing on an area of law typically reserved for the states.261 Due to
the invalidation of Title III, the question that remains to be answered
is whether the advantages offered by Title III warrant an attempt to
reenact the statute, or whether alternatives have surfaced which suffi-
ciently address the problem. A careful examination of the advantages
and disadvantages of Title III supports the need for its reenactment.
1. Advantages of Title III
Over the course of Title III's enactment, Congress stressed the need
for a civil rights remedy for gender-motivated violence, since no other
civil rights legislation addressed this specific issue.262 Congress cre-
ated Title III to provide a civil cause of action for victims of gender-
motivated violence, with the intent that the statute act as an extension
of existing state laws and to supplement federal civil rights causes of
258. Id.
259. Other provisions of the VAWA I provide assistance to victims of gender-motivated vio-
lence, but not a way for the victims to bring a civil claim or collect damages. See supra notes 52-
53.
260. See supra notes 77-194 and accompanying text.
261. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752-54, 1756-59 (discussing the concerns that under Commerce
Clause and Fourteenth Amendment analysis, Title III would take over areas of traditional state
concern).
262. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 40-43 (1990).
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action.2 63 "In addition to serving the important societal function of
recognizing that violence against women [was] gender discrimination,
the VAWA remedy [had] distinct advantages over existing state
laws. ' '264 Title III provided a victim of gender-motivated violence
with more control over her situation than state laws had provided, by
mandating civil relief when the state refused to prosecute her case, 265
or when she was precluded by state law from bringing a state civil
cause of action. 266
Title III also offered decided advantages over the criminal justice
system by allowing the victim to "call her attacker to the witness stand
to account for his behavior," whereas "in a criminal case the defen-
dant may remain silent .... ",267 Victim empowerment was evident in
Title III because it gave the victim the opportunity to obtain a perma-
nent injunctive order forbidding the defendant from contacting her,
rather than a state-law order of protection that lasts for a specific
amount of time.268
Another advantage of Title III, over existing state laws, was the
ability of the victim to collect damages from her attacker, including
punitive damages and reasonable attorney's fees.269 Many times in
criminal proceedings, when the attacker was prosecuted, the result of
a guilty verdict did little to benefit the victim personally or finan-
cially. 270 A guilty verdict for an attacker or abuser could result in
fines paid to the court, probation or possible imprisonment, none of
which provide for the financial needs of the victim as a result of the
attack or abuse.271 Accordingly, Title III addressed gender motivated
violence, specifically domestic violence, in a way that state laws had
never considered.
2. Disadvantages of Title III
The opponents of Title III attacked the legislation, not because of
its substance, but rather because of its constitutional implications.
Those who opposed the enactment of Title III had three primary con-
263. See Hearn, supra note 86, at 1102-03 (discussing the VAWA I civil rights remedy).
264. Id. at 1104.
265. Id. (noting that nine states still have a rape exclusion for married women, where the state
will not prosecute a husband accused of raping his wife).
266. Id. at 1105 ("Some states, for example, limit a wife's ability to sue her husband for an
intentional tort such as battery.").
267. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 42 (1990).
268. See Hearn, supra note 86, at 1105-06 (examining the VAWA I civil rights remedy's advan-
tages over state laws).
269. Id. at 1103.
270. See supra notes 165, 174 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 165, 174 and accompanying text.
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cerns, each of which were based on the idea of federalism: the possible
infringement of a traditionally state governed area,272 the impact that
Title III would have on the federal courts,273 and the possibility of
unlimited congressional power.274 Addressing the first concern, Title
III was perceived as interfering with a matter that traditionally be-
longed to the states and as "unnecessarily duplicative of existing state
remedies. '275 Many critics of Title III argued that it also ignored the
benefits of state intervention, such as "the expertise of state courts in
the area," and "the capacity of the states to experiment with local
solutions." 276
The second concern expressed by opponents was that Title III
would further tie up an already overburdened federal court system. 277
Title 111, although not a criminal provision, functioned in a similar
fashion to other federalized criminal provisions, by allowing "a large
volume of actions traditionally tried in state courts to be brought in
federal courts. '278 Critics, before the decision in Morrison, identified
Title III as providing a "new private right of action so sweeping, that it
could involve the federal courts in a whole host of domestic relations
disputes. '279 Notably, this was one of the main concerns of the Su-
preme Court in Morrison, and the concern that most influenced the
deciding vote of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.280
272. See Bassler, supra note 134, at 1162-64 (discussing how states have traditionally dealt
with domestic violence and that there is no evidence that demonstrates that states cannot handle
the problem on their own).
273. Id. at 1148-49 (predicting that Title III would add to the already over-crowded federal
court docket and place a huge strain on the federal court system). See Carty, supra note 28, at
483-84 (noting that the potential impact of the VAWA I on federal courts "cannot be ignored").
274. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 828-29 (reasoning, by the district court, that "the practical impli-
cations of concluding that gender-motivated violence was sufficiently related to interstate com-
merce to justify its regulation would be to grant Congress power to regulate virtually the whole
of criminal and domestic relations law").
275. Carty, supra note 28, at 483.
276, Id. at 482-83. See Bassler, supra note 134, at 1184 (noting superior skills of state courts in
the domestic violence area and a greater extent of resources for victims in state court); Betty
Levinson, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: Legislative History, Pol-
icy Implications, and Litigation Strategy, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 401, 406 (1996) (recommending use of
state court to bring the VAWA I action due to greater expertise of state judges in domestic
violence).
277. Carty, supra note 28, at 482-85; Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 828-29 (discussing one reason why
the district court held Title III unconstitutional was because it would have allowed federal reme-
dies in addition to state remedies, even when state remedies were sufficient).
278. Carty, supra note 28, at 483.
279. Hearn, supra note 86, at 1124. See also Sullivan, supra note 74 (discussing the extent of
congressional power under the commerce clause after Lopez).
280. See supra note 243. See Mincavage, supra note 28, at 441 (breaking down the probable
votes of the current Justices in Commerce Clause cases).
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The third concern expressed by opponents of Title III was that by
enacting Title III, Congress displayed that it has unlimited power.281
The concern over "the proper state-federal balance" 282 was evident in
the Supreme Court's 1994 decision of United States v. Lopez.28 3 In
fact, the Supreme Court reiterated the same federalism concerns in
Morrison when it found Title III unconstitutional. 284 This concern
centered around the use of Congress' powers under the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that if Title
III were to survive constitutional scrutiny, then Congress would, in
effect, have unbridled power to pass any type of legislation. 285
Although critics of Title III have expressed various constitutional
concerns, they have never opposed the goals of the legislation. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly acknowledged this fact in
Brzonkala, by specifically stating that "no one favor[s] violence
against women. '286 The court also alluded to the proposition that Ti-
tle III was "laudable social policy"287 that was simply enacted under
the wrong constitutional power.288 The recognition of the purpose be-
hind Title III left the door open for the consideration of saving Title
III or exploring alternative ways to accomplish similar goals. Unfortu-
nately, the goal and purpose behind Title III will need to be accom-
plished through alternative methods.
III. ANALYSIS
Entering the Twenty-first Century, the United States remains a
country where the saying "all men are created equal"289 means exactly
what it says; "men" are created equal. Sadly, although society has
made great strides, gender inequality remains an issue of great debate
among feminists and legal scholars.290 Nowhere in society are the ste-
281. The concerns were based in notions of federalism and state autonomy. Bassler, supra
note 134, at 1184 (discussing state autonomy); Carty, supra note 28, at 483-85 (expressing con-
cerns about Congress's interference in state action).
282. Carty, supra note 28, at 484.
283. 514 U.S. 549 (1997).
284. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752-54. See Carty, supra note 28, at 483 (discussing the Fourth
Circuit's concerns about federalism when it decided Brzonkala).
285. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752-54. See Carty, supra note 28, at 483 (discussing the
Brzonkala decision and the Fourth Circuit's concern over the powers of Congress).
286. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 889.
287. Id.
288. Id. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1759.
289. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
290. For a discussion on gender inequality viewed through the lens of different feminist theo-
ries, see Catharine MacKinnon, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 133
(1987) (discussing gender inequality in light of a radical feminist theory). Studies still show that
although women are making more money now than ever before, pay equality has yet to be
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reotypes and gender biases more obvious than in the treatment of do-
mestic violence crimes and its victims. 291 Although the state
legislatures have made great strides in the area of gender equality,
"those responsible for applying and enforcing the laws.., have lagged
far behind. '292 As illustrated by the extensive legislative findings of
Title III, violence against women remains a serious problem affecting
women all over the country, and it demands more aggressive mea-
sures.293 Title III represented the beginning of those measures.
Domestic violence, as well as other violent acts directed at women,
continues to scar America's families and our society, with no end in
sight.294 Since the Supreme Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Brzonkala and declared Title III unconstitu-
tional,295 the need for legislation protecting victims of domestic vio-
lence mandates that alternative theories for enacting this type of
legislation be explored. In considering the alternatives, an inherent
tension exists between the broader goal of Title III, providing a civil
rights remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence, and its under-
achieved. See National Committee on Pay Equity, The Wage Gap Over Time: In Real Dollars,
Women See a Widening Gap, available at http://www.feminist.com/fairplay/f change.htm (last
visited Feb. 20, 2001) (citing median weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers by
occupation). In fact, since the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the average woman has earned approxi-
mately $13,000 less than the average man. Id. For example, in 1997 women aged twenty-four to
fifty-four earned 74.4 percent less than men in the same age group. See Borgna Brunner, The
Equal Pay Act Revisted: Narrowing the Wage Gap Halfa Penny Per Year, available at wsysiwyg://
764/http://www.infoplease.comlspot/equalpayact/html (last visited Feb. 20, 2001). Despite these
facts, the awareness of gender inequality has become more public, resulting in greater discourse
concerning the subject. Currently many law schools offer classes that focus on feminist issues
such as feminist jurisprudence or other issues such as domestic violence or sex crimes. For exam-
ple, the law schools of DePaul University, the University of Chicago, and Northwestern Univer-
sity all offer at least one course each semester that focuses on legal issues examined through a
feminist theory or theories.
291. See supra Part II.A.
292. Epstein, supra note 15, at 13. See Bracher, infra note 405, at 156 (discussing the tradi-
tional treatment of domestic violence crimes by law enforcement in comparison to the state
legislatures' responses to the problem).
293. See generally NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, No. NCJ-181867, Extent
Nature and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings from the National Violence
Against Women Survey (2000) (presenting statistics and analyzing data concerning intimate
violence).
294. It is commonly accepted that domestic violence is cyclical and that it will continue if not
interrupted by someone outside the family unit. Studies have indicated that most abusers en-
countered domestic violence in their own homes as children, either as a victim or a witness.
KAPLAN, infra note 382, at 141. Society's failure to effectively deal with the root of domestic
violence in the home has resulted in an environment where women fear for their lives if they call
for help and children grow up believing that violence is the normal way of dealing with relation-
ships. Id.
295. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). See supra notes 213-259 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Morrison opinion).
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lying narrow focus of remedying the problem of domestic violence.
This requires a difficult determination of the primary purpose of Title
III of the VAWA I and how that purpose can survive after its death.
Title III represented the federal government's response to a serious
problem, yet when considered in the context of domestic violence,
there remained a question as to whether it was the most effective rem-
edy.296 Despite Title III, most domestic violence victims can still only
find the relief they need through the criminal justice system, thus very
few victims of domestic violence are willing or able to pursue the rem-
edy that Title III offered. Bringing a suit under Title III required not
only an affirmative action by the victim, but also the funds and the
time to hire an attorney to pursue the case. In many cases of domestic
violence, the victim relies on her abuser for financial support, and the
attempt to collect damages from him in a civil suit might be a costly
and futile effort.
Nonetheless, Title III represented necessary social policy. Accord-
ingly, reenactment pursuant to another constitutional power should be
considered. The Thirteenth Amendment represents a rarely used con-
stitutional weapon, designed to provide Congress with the power to
remedy occasions of involuntary servitude, 297 and should be consid-
ered as an alternative basis for reenacting Title 111.298
A. Can The Thirteenth Amendment Revive Title III?
In 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Consitu-
tion was passed. 299 The intent behind the Amendment was to eradi-
cate the slavery of African-Americans in the United States.300 The
Thirteenth Amenendment represented one of the first affirmative ac-
tions taken by the United States government to address the abridg-
296. This presents a difficult dilemma, although there is the belief that this country should
recognize the civil rights of victims of gender-motivated violence, this Comment will focus on
domestic violence. Domestic violence, by its nature, and the majority of its victims requires
more than a civil remedy to combat the problem. The question arises as to whether victims of
domestic violence really have the opportunity to go to federal court to sue for damages when in
many cases, it is difficult to get them to testify in a criminal case. See supra notes 134-139.
297. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §1.
298. For an in-depth analysis of the possibility of Congress enacting Title III under the Thir-
teenth Amendment powers, see generally Hearn, supra note 86; Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond
Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 207 (1992).
299. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
300. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872) (stating that "[u]ndoubtedly while ne-
gro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it for-
bids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter"). See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at
645-46 (discussing the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court cases
defining the scope of the Amendment).
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ment of a group's human rights, specifically that of the African-
American population.
Although the government has been involved in the protection of
human rights since the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, it is
clear that it takes more than the law to define the rights of human
beings and to ensure that those rights are not abridged. Along with
the support of the legal system, human rights must begin in the home:
"To punish disobedience and discipline liberty, family tradition per-
petuates a culture of terror that humiliates women, teaches children to
lie, and spreads the plague of fear. Human rights should begin at
home .... ,,30 Domestic violence represents the antithesis of this
idea.
The definition of what constitutes "human rights" is constantly be-
ing questioned. In the ever-changing American society, the concept
of what constitutes a fundamental freedom and the scope of civil
rights has continually evolved over time. It could be argued that the
rights accorded to citizens throughout American history have been,
and continue to be, based partially on physical characteristics, such as
gender, or external characteristics, such as social class.
The scope of civil rights becomes more uncertain when examined in
the context of the Constitution. This uncertainity stems from the con-
flicting views of how the Constitution should be interpreted and how
that interpretation affects issues in modern society. 30 2 One view of
legal commentators is that the Constitution, designed to be a flexible
document, should be interpreted according to the changing values and
beliefs of American citizens. 303 Other scholars disagree with this in-
terpretation and argue that the Constitution should be interpreted ac-
301. EDUARDO GALEANO, THE BOOK OF EMBRACES: IMAGES AND TEXT 143 (1989).
302. It is clear from an examination of Supreme Court jurisprudence that the Court's inter-
pretation of the Constitution has changed over time, depending on the members of the Court
and the social situation of the country. See RALPH A. RossuM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7-10 (1983). The Supreme Court has actually acknowledged that its inter-
pretation of certain constitutional principles has evolved over time, according to the changes in
society and the legal realm. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1748-54 (discussing the evolving interpre-
tation of the Commerce Clause).
303. Critical scholars have attacked the validity of interpreting the Constitution based on orig-
inal intent. According to Randall Kennedy:
[T]he endeavor to confine choice by reference to the intentions of white men situated
in the [E]ighteenth or [N]ineteenth [C]entury should be rejected as aspiration because,
if followed, it would quite likely portend the nullification of legal achievements that
supports the rights of racial minorities and others whose interests in previous centuries
generally had a lower level of priority than obtains today.
Randall L. Kennedy, Race and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Power of Interpretational Choice,
in A LESS THAN PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S. COSTITUTION 273,
275 (Jules Lobel ed., 1988).
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cording to the intent of the men who created it;304 a time when
gender, race, and social class were not recognized as social issues.305The largest threat to the possible reenactment of Title III is a stag-
nant interpretation of the Constitution. The only problem with Title
III, according to the Supreme Court, is that its enactment was beyond
Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment.30 6 Accordingly, it should be reenacted under a valid
power. Therefore, to reenact Title III, Congress must look beyond its
settled interpretation of the Constitution and arrive at an interpreta-
tion which allows the enactment of legislation that addresses the
problems of the future.
1. The Thirteenth Amendment Power
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution was passed in order
to eradicate slavery of African-Americans in the United States.30 7
Despite the context of its passing, the Thirteenth Amendment was not
specifically limited to the slavery of African-Americans; in fact, the
Amendment used very broad language that is open for interpreta-
tion.308 Specifically, section one of the Thirteenth Amendment in-
structed that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, . . . shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion. ' '30 9 The Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution is a "grand
yet simple declaration of the personal freedom of all the human race
within the jurisdiction of this government. '310 This broad language of
the Supreme Court 311 confirms the idea that the protection granted by
the Thirteenth Amendment is not conditioned upon race, gender, age,
sexual orientation, religious belief, or any other personal characteris-
304. Several of the Supreme Court justices over the years have interpreted the Constitution
based on the "original intent" of the Framers. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 37-46 (Geoffrey R.
Stone, et al eds., 3d ed. 1996). For example, Justice Hugo Black is well known for his staunch
support for interpreting the Constitution based on the Framers' intent as defined by looking to
the text. Id.
305. At the time the United States Constitution was written, property owners, who were white
men, were the only people allowed to vote. See RossuM & TARR, supra note 302, at 10-13. At
the time this important document came into existence, African-Americans were considered
property and women had no rights outside of the home. Id.
306. See supra notes 213-257 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
308. See id. The Thirteenth Amendment was specifically worded so as to outlaw all forms of
slavery or involuntary servitude. U.S. CONST. amend. XII § 1.
309. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1873).
310. Id.
311. Id.
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tic.312 The Thirteenth Amendment was enacted for the purpose of
abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude forever, commanding
that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist. '313
Section two of the Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress the
broad power to enforce the amendment with "appropriate legisla-
tion. ' 314 It was not until 1883 that the concept of what constituted
''appropriate legislation" was considered by the Supreme Court in the
Civil Rights Cases.315 The Supreme Court explained that enforce-
ment of the Thirteenth Amendment meant that Congress had the
power to regulate the "badges and incidents" of slavery. 316 As a re-
sult, the Thirteenth Amendment abolished both slavery and involun-
tary servitude, and granted Congress the authority to legislate against
any deprivation of the rights that were enumerated in the Civil Rights
Act of 1870.317
Although the current interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment
implies that it only reaches situations dealing with race, the Supreme
Court has never expressly stated that gender could not fall within the
boundries of the amendment. Further, the Thirteenth Amendment
has always been applied to private conduct. 318 An examination of the
historical subjugation of women, the societal acceptance of domestic
violence, and the conditions battered women commonly face,319 will
support Congress' use of the Thirteenth Amendment to enact Title
III.
2. Involuntary Servitude Today
The Thirteenth Amendment's "sweeping words and underlying vi-
sion" outlaw slavery of all forms in all places, as it was designed to
eradicate societal and individual coercion or control over one or more
312. See Akhil Reed Amar and Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse As Slavery: A Thirteenth
Amendment Response To DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1359, 1359 (1992) (discussing the his-
tory of the Thirteenth Amendment and stating that "[e]mancipation did not discriminate be-
cause of age . . . the Amendment embraced . . . all persons, whatever their race or national
origin").
313. See Hearn, supra note 86, at 1142.
314. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. Section two of the Thirteenth Amendment specifically
states, "Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Id.
315. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
316. Id. at 20 (stating that Congress has the power to "pass all laws necessary and proper for
abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States").
317. The Civil Rights Act of 1870, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
318. Amar, supra note 312, at 1359.
319. For a discussion of domestic violence as torture and an argument that it should be consid-
ered a human rights violation, see Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday:
Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 291 (1994).
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persons.320 Accordingly, the Thirteenth Amendment applies in the
context of domestic violence, 321 if it can be shown that there are "inci-
dents of slavery or involuntary servitude" present in the
relationships. 322
The use of the term "slavery" to describe any modern situation
strikes fear in the hearts of politicians and judges, and remains the
reason why the Thirteenth Amendment is a nullity. The word "slav-
ery" has become taboo in this country, with most of society equating it
with the horrific experiences of African-American slaves. Although
the Thirteenth Amendment was enacted in response to those exper-
iences,323 this interpretation need not be the only one.
Fortunately for this country, slavery, as it was historically defined,
no longer exists in the United States, yet a different type of involun-
tary servitude has replaced that historical version. However, society
fails to see beyond the history of the American slave trade to consider
that slavery might still exist in another form. "Slavery" is not so nar-
rowly defined as to only require whips and chains, but rather, it is
broadly defined as "a power relation of domination, degradation, and
subservience, in which human beings are treated as chattel, not per-
sons. ' 324 The power relationship exercised in incidents of domestic
violence fits within this definition of slavery, 325 because control and
physical coercion lie at the heart of abusive domestic relationships. It
is arguable that society's passive acceptance of domestic violence is
not based on lack of concern, but rather rooted in historical notions
about women and abusive relationships. 326
320. Amar, supra note 312, at 1365.
321. The term "domestic violence" is used in this section to describe relationships where the
abuse/battering has taken place more than two times and has been instigated by a male intimate.
This is not to belittle the experience of one who has suffered at the hands of an intimate on only
one occasion or those who have suffered at the hands of a female intimate, but this reflects the
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment in that one incident would not necessarily be considered
controlling or coercive. Statistics show that women are more likely to suffer abuse at the hands
of a male intimate than vice versa. See supra note 21.
322. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 645 (discussing the
Supreme Court interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment).
323. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
324. Amar, supra note 312, at 1365.
325. The purpose of this Comment is not to analogize the experiences of a domestic violence
victim who voluntarily stays with an abuser to the experiences of those who were forced into
slavery in this country. The concept of "slavery" here is limited to the enunciated definition and
not the structure of slavery that existed in the United States. Here it is only to say that the
psychological and physical abuse that a domestic violence victim faces fits within the definition
of "slavery" concerning a power relation of degradation.
326. See infra notes 327-336 and accompanying text.
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Historically, women were considered property of the men in their
families, either their fathers or their husbands, 327 and had no legal sta-
tus separate from the men in their families. As long ago as the Roman
Era, incidents of domestic violence were present and condoned.328
These same attitudes were later reflected in the English common law.
The English common law not only permitted, but expected hus-
bands to chastise their wives, resulting in the "rule of thumb. ' 329 The
"rule of thumb" theory placed a limit on the husband's ability to pun-
ish his wife; he was allowed to hit her as long as the rod was no thicker
than his thumb.330 Although this rule was enacted supposedly to pro-
tect women, it only perpetuated the idea that husbands were to con-
trol their wives.331 The English common law and its descendent, the
early American legal system, represented a systematic relegation of an
entire group of people to a condition of inferiority and attributed this
inferiority to their physical characteristics. 332 Accordingly, the mod-
ern problem of domestic violence can be traced to the acceptance of
wife "chastisement," which was present in the American legal system
as recently as the early Twentieth Century.333 Although the laws con-
cerning domestic violence have changed, the social perceptions about
domestic violence and its victims have not been altered.
"Violence is the most overt and effective means of male societal
control over women. ' 334 "Male violence against women captures the
essence of male dominance, female submission," 335 which is similar to
the violence practiced against African-American slaves. "[M]odern
violence against women is a badge and incident of [N]ineteenth-
[C]entury slavery of the [N]ineteenth-[C]entury involuntary servitude
of coveture." 336 For example, in battering relationships, women are
deprived of their personal liberty and dignity through physical con-
straint, violence, injury, or death, which is not unlike the experiences
327. Bernadette Dunn Sewell, Note, History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and Legislative Re-
sponses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 983, 983-85 (1989).
328. Roman society was very patriarchal in nature and, accordingly, wives were controlled by
their husband and the husbands were expected to punish their wives. "According to early Ro-
man law, a man could beat, divorce or murder his wife for offenses committed by her which
besmirched his honor or threatened his property rights." Sewell, supra note 327, at 985.
329. See supra note 96.
330. See supra note 121.
331. Cain, supra note 48, at 376; Mabbun, supra note 28, at 212-13; Sewell, supra note 327, at
988.
332. Brenneke, supra note 49, at 22.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 11. See generally McConnell, supra note 298 (discussing domestic violence as invol-
untary servitude).
335. Id.
336. Hearn, supra note 86.
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of slavery that resulted in the enactment of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
3. Reenacting Title III Pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment
Title III was originally enacted in response to the failure of society
and the criminal justice system to treat gender-motivated crimes as
seriously as other bias-related crimes. 337 Domestic violence repre-
sents the quintessential gender-motivated crime where the victims are
abused simply because they are women. The characteristics of an abu-
sive relationship support Title III's reenactment under the Thirteenth
Amendment.
The Thirteenth Amendment incorporates domestic violence by ad-
dressing private actions and prohibiting all forms of slavery or invol-
untary servitude.338 Domestic violence consists of the violent acts of
one man against one woman, 339 and when it manifests as a cycle of
abuse, it results in a form of slavery to the victim. 340 Once the cycle of
domestic violence begins, it is likely to escalate until the legal system
intervenes or one of the participants is dead.
Domestic violence is a system of dominance and subservience, often
on a personal scale, and represents the reduction of women to the
status of material possessions. 341 It results from an abuser's need for
domination, coercion, degradation, and control. A man who abuses
women often engages in such behavior because he believes that his
wife or girlfriend, in essence, is a possession that he has a right to
control.342 Once a pattern of violence is established, the victim essen-
tially becomes captive to her abuser, feeling the need to request per-
mission to leave or make any personal decisions, lest she pay the price
for disobedience. A woman who finds herself in this situation may
337. See supra note 82. Although Title III addressed all acts of gender-motivated violence,
the discussion of its reenactment under the Thirteenth Amendment will focus on domestic vio-
lence where women are the victims.
338. See supra notes 300, 308 and accompanying text.
339. Of course, there may be children involved, which brings up issues beyond the scope of
this Comment. For an analysis of how the Thirteenth Amendment could be used to protect
children in abusive households, see generally Amar, supra note 312.
340. See generally Hearn, supra note 86.
341. Amar, supra note 312, at 1384.
342. See KAPLAN, infra note 382, at 148-49 (discussing the personality traits of the typical
batterer and his need for control over the victim).
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feel she cannot leave 343 due to the man's threats of further violence or
even death. 344
It is impossible to understand the physical and psychological effect
that domestic violence has on its victims, that is unless an individual
has personally experienced such abuse or has spent an extensive
amount of time with a victim of domestic violence. Therefore, the
problem of domestic violence is often not given the attention it truly
deserves. Further, victims rarely have the ability to help themselves
because the victim often finds herself in a situation that is beyond her
control as the cycle of abuse escalates. 345 For example, the abuser will
often have financial control or use the victim's children to threaten
her to stay. 346
The psychological and physical effects of domestic violence, which
result in the involuntary servitude of the victim to her abuser, have
been acknowledged by the courts that have recognized the battered
woman's syndrome (BWS). 347 BWS recognizes that most domestic vi-
olence is a cycle of abuse and reconciliation that leads the victim into
codependency with the batterer, both emotionally and financially. 348
BWS refers to a "set of symptoms commonly found in women who are
involved in intimate relationships with men who use physical and psy-
chological coercion to dominate and maintain the relationship. '349
BWS is characterized by the response that the victim has to the cycle
of abuse. 350 Specifically, victims who exhibit BWS have experienced
343. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
344. See VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES, supra note 21, at v (noting that only fifty percent of do-
mestic violence incidents are reported, the most common reason being that victims "feared retal-
iation or they felt the police would not be able to help them").
345. See generally supra Part III.B. (discussing the importance of educational programs and
training for all of those involved in domestic violence cases).
346. In one of the most disturbing cases, the victim, Molly, who was married to Jim, the
abuser, endured over five years of abuse that began as hair pulling and slapping and evolved into
sexual abuse and home imprisonment. ANGELA BROWN, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 56-58,
89-93 (1987). At one time, after a night of rape and beating, Jim told Molly that if she ever left
the house or disobeyed him she would "lose" her son, Kevin. Id. Molly was only able to escape
Jim in the end by killing him; she shot him when he began strangling Kevin. Id. at 131-33. Jim
told Molly that he was going to kill Kevin because he was the "only thing that really matters to
her." Id.
347. See New Jersey v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 369-73 (N.J. 1984) (describing in detail the nature
and effects of the battered woman's syndrome). For further discussion of BWS, see MARCIA
MOBILIA BOUMIL, ET AL., LAW AND GENDER BIAS 211-14 (1994) (discussing the cycle of abuse
that leads to BWS); Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syn-
drome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REv. 973 (1995) (criticizing the use of BWS as demeaning
representation of woman battering).
348. See BOUMIL, supra note 347, at 211-14.
349. Id. at 212 (discussing typical phases of the cycle of abuse that often results in BWS).
350. Many commentators have focused on the cycle of abuse and explored the specific phases
that are involved. Studies have shown that both victims and abusers tend to have certain charac-
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physical ailments not connected to the physical abuse, and psychologi-
cal disturbances such as anxiety and agitation.351 There are different
experiences that often overwhelm the victim and make it impossible
for her to break out of the cycle. Thus, the acceptance of BWS by
courts supports the characterization of domestic violence as involun-
tary servitude.
Just as slavery, domestic violence was at one time socially accept-
able. 352 Although such violence is no longer considered acceptable,
the problems in the legal system have created abusers that have no
fear of punishment,353 and victims without means of escape. The fail-
ure of the legal system to deal with the problem of domestic violence
effectively condones the abuser's actions.354
Most victims internalize the blame for their situation, as a result of
the social stigma that is associated with domestic violence, and often
refuse to report the incidents. 355 For example, studies show that "the
most common reasons given by victims for not contacting the police
[are] often that they consider the incident to be a private or personal
matter, they fear retaliation, or they feel that the police [will] not be
able to do anything about the incident. '356 Further, statistics show
that domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to women in the
United States, yet it is one of the most underreported crimes.357
The Thirteenth Amendment provides Congress with an alternative
constitutional power under which it can reenact Title III. In the event
that Congress could not use the Thirteenth Amendment to reenact
Title III, the federal government should focus on working with the
states. This focus would acknowledge the role of the states in enforc-
ing the civil rights of domestic violence victims, while also providing
incentives for the states to take affirmative actions against domestic
violence. Through the other provisions of the VAWA I, Congress has
teristics in common, for a further discussion of these findings, see KAPLAN, infra note 382, at
147-49 (exploring the emotional and behavioral symptoms of domestic violence victims and
abusers).
351. These include stomach pains and sleeping difficulties. See BOUMIL, supra note 347, at
213.
352. See supra notes 49, 121, 328 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 98-150 and accompanying text.
355. See VIOLENCE By INTIMATES, supra note 21, at v.
356. Id.
357. Estimates are that only forty-five percent of domestic violence incidents are actually re-
ported. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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the ability to provide additional funding to states that specifically fo-
cus on domestic violence prevention and education.35 8
B. The States' Changing Role
Six years have passed since Title III was enacted and many things
have happened to bring domestic violence out of the private homes
and into the public sector. In 1995, domestic violence came to the
forefront when the public learned that O.J. Simpson had abused his
murdered wife, Nicole Brown Simpson.359 During the same time pe-
riod, the Department of Justice recognized domestic violence as a na-
tional problem through its creation of the Violence Against Women
Office.360 As a result, the states began to receive more funding from
the federal government for implementing domestic violence pro-
grams, 361 a domestic violence hotline was created, 362 and all fifty
states formed domestic violence coalitions pursuant to the other pro-
visions of the VAWA 1.363
If Title III cannot be reenacted pursuant to the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, Congress should consider furthering its collaboration with the
states to address the problem of domestic violence at the state level.
There is evidence to show that the states have affirmatively responded
to the problem of gender-motivated violence, specifically domestic vi-
358. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 368, 373, 464 and accom-
panying text.
359. See State v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 21768, at *8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 18,
1995). Although O.J. Simpson was found not guilty of the murder of Nicole Brown Simpson,
there were at least four police reports in existence that documented his escalating violent behav-
ior. Id. Immediately after the news of the Simpson's prior abuse, domestic violence hotlines
received a significant increase in calls. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim
Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, at 1852 n. 10 (1996)
[hereinafter Hanna, No Right to Choose].
360. The Violence Against Women Office was created by the Department of Justice as a result
of the provisions of the VAWA I. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN OF-
FICE, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo (last visited Sept. 14, 2000) [hereinafter VAWO
website]. In collaboration with the Violence Against Women Advisory Council, the Violence
Against Women Office has taken on the responsibilities of increasing awareness and education
about domestic violence and approving the grants to states that apply for funds supplied through
the VAWA I. Id. Information about the Office and the different activities it is involved in are
available on the Internet at the Department of Justice website. Id.
361. See infra note 362.
362. On February 26, 1996, President Clinton announced a nationwide, 24-hour, toll-free do-
mestic violence hotline. The number is 1-800-799-SAFE, and is also available for the hearing-
impaired and those who do not speak English. The hotline provides immediate crisis interven-
tion for those in need. Callers can receive counseling and be referred directly to help in their
communities, including emergency information and shelters. Also, counselors can refer callers
to community resources and medical help. VAWO website, supra note 360, http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo/speeches/manual/help.htm.
363. See id.
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olence, since the enactment of Title III.364 States have financial incen-
tives to treat domestic violence more seriously pursuant to the funding
provisions of the VAWA 1,365 the desire to maintain control of a tradi-
tional state legislative area, and the political accountability of the state
legislature to the public.
Statistics show that a number of states have responded by mandat-
ing change in the way its legal system handles domestic violence.366
Many states have enacted aggressive legislation targeting law enforce-
ment367 and the criminal justice system,368 as well as advocacy and
community outreach programs. 369 In light of the states' changing role
in the context of gender-motivated violence and the possibilities of
restitution under state law,370 the concern should be to continue the
promotion of state action. The enactment and subsequent striking
down of Title III need not have been in vain. The federal government
can continue to address the concerns underlying Title III by providing
more incentives to the states and collaborating with the states to en-
sure that programs directed toward domestic violence are successful
and domestic violence victims receive justice. 371
364. Although it has only recently become an important social concern, incidents of domestic
violence have actually decreased over the past six years. According to Violence By Intimates,
"the rate of victimization of women by an intimate declined from 1993-1996." VIOLENCE By
INTIMATES, supra note 21, at 3. The number of murders by intimates have also been decreasing
steadily since the 1970s, "in 1996 the number of intimate murders was 36% lower than in 1976."
Id. at 5.
365. 42 U.S.C. § 10418 (1995). The funding provision authorized over $800 million to be
available in funding to the states over a five-year period. See National Council of Family &
Juvenile Court Judges, 1 FAM. VIOLENCE LEGIS. UPDATE 8 (1995), available at http://
www.dulawsearch.com/pubs/images/95Legis.pdf (last visited March 23, 2001).
366. See THE URBAN INsTITUTE, 2000 REPORT: EVALUATION OF THE STOP FORMULA
GRANTS TO COMBAT VIOLENCE AOAINSTWOMEN viii (noting that the grants provided to com-
munities through the VAWA I have increased the number of domestic violence victims treated
by agencies).
367. These include police training and education programs on how to handle domestic vio-
lence calls, as well as varying types of arrest policies. See supra Part III.B.1.a.
368. Title V (Equal Justice for Women in the Courts Act) of the VAWA I provides for funding
to states for education and training for judges and court personnel concerning gender-motivated
violence. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 4 (1993). A majority of states have implemented gender bias
task forces to study their court systems and the findings have been disturbing. See Jeannette F.
Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 1, 3 (1996) (stating that "at least thirty-five jurisdictions" have admit-
ted "that they are plagued with bias based on gender").
369. See supra Part III.B.l.d.
370. These include bringing suit under tort law for battery or assault, or in the states with hate
crime legislation, bringing suit for domestic violence as a bias crime. See infra Part III.B.2.
371. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court's holding that Title III was unconstitutional
has jeopardized states' funding, see infra Part IV.
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1. Incentives Available Under the VAWA I
The VAWA I did more than just provide for a civil remedy for vic-
tims of gender-motivated violence. The act was one of the many bills
passed by Congress that appropriated conditional funding to states.372
Many of the VAWA I provisions, other than Title III, created incen-
tives for individual states to address violence against women. 373 The
provisions were designed specifically to encourage states to become
more proactive in preventing gender-motivated violence.374 The pro-
visions included funding for states to provide education and preven-
tion programs,375 to develop support programs for victims of gender-
motivated violence, 376 and to implement new ways of addressing this
pervasive problem.377 To receive funding under the VAWA I, the
state was required to apply for each grant and implement certain
changes determined by the type of grant that the state was seeking.
The more creative the measure or drastic the change, the more money
the state was eligible to receive.
One of the primary justifications for Title III was the evidence that
the states were not adequately addressing the problem of gender-mo-
372. The numerous amount of legislation that has been passed is beyond the scope of this
Comment. For a focused look at the federal legislation passed between 1990-1997 dealing with
domestic violence, see George B. Stevenson, Federal Antiviolence and Abuse Legislation: To-
ward Elimination of Disparate Justice for Women and Children, 33 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 848,
854 (1997) (discussing the VAWA I as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act).
373. The independent portions of the Act were: Safe Streets for Women, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
Title IV, Subtitle A, 108 Stat. 1903 (1994); Safe Homes for Women, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title
IV, Subtitle B, 108 Stat. 1925 (1994); Equal Justice for Women in Courts, 42 U.S.C. § 13391 et
seq. (1994); Violence Against Women Act Improvements, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, Subtitle
E, 108 Stat. 1945 (1994); National Stalker & Domestic Violence Reduction, 42 U.S.C. § 14031 et
seq. (1994); Protections for Battered Immigrant Women & Children, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title
IV, Subtitle G, 108 Stat. 1953 (1994).
374. See the VAWA I Subtitle B § 1701 "Law Enforcement and Prosecution Grants to Reduce
Violent Crimes Against Women" (stating that the general purpose of the program and grants is
to "assist States, Indian tribes, cities, and other localities to develop effective law enforcement
and prosecution strategies to combat violent crimes against women and in particular, to focus
efforts on those areas with the highest rates of violent crime against women").
375. Services*Training*Officers*Prosecutors (STOP) Grants are awarded by the Violence
Against Women Office (VAWO) puruant to the VAWA I. These grants were provided to states
in order to develop and strengthen their response to domestic violence. VAWO website, supra
note 360.
376. Twenty-five percent of each STOP grant awarded to a state must be allocated to victim
services. Id.
377. Grants available through the VAWO include: STOP Violence Against Women Formula
Grants, STOP Violence Against Women Indian Women Discretionary Grants, Grants to En-
courage Arrest Policies, Rural Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grants,
Domestic Violence Victims' Civil Legal Assistance Grants, and Grants to Combat Violent
Crimes Against Women on Campuses. These grants were available to any state or local govern-
ment for uses involved in combating domestic violence. See VAWO website, supra note 360.
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tivated violence. 378 The enactment of the VAWA I made dramatic
changes in how the states dealt with domestic violence. The funding
provisions of the act provided the states with over $800 million in or-
der to enourage change. As a result of this funding, states began to
address domestic violence as the disturbing epidemic that it had
become. 379
Despite the more proactive response that most states have taken,
there remains much work to be done in the quest to put an end to
domestic violence, especially in light of the fact that Title III has been
struck down. States cannot end domestic violence alone; a fundamen-
tal change must be made in our society, at both the state and commu-
nity level, if we are to end the plight of domestic violence victims. The
steps that Congress took to return the power to the states represented
a movement in the right direction. Accordingly, the developments
that the states have made should be examined in deciding what action
Congress should take in the future.
a. The Legislative Response
The states' legislative response to the problem of domestic violence
represents the first step in combatting gender-bias in the state legal
system and improving the lives of domestic violence victims nation-
wide. Over the last twenty years, state legislatures have taken steps to
address the need for more aggressive domestic violence legislation 380
and the presence of gender bias in the legal system. 381 As a result, the
increasing public acknowledgement of the domestic violence epi-
demic382 has created a situation where state politicians cannot afford
to ignore the need for legislation dealing with gender-motivated vio-
lence, unless they risk being voted out of office. This public accounta-
378. See supra Part If.
379. See BOUMIL, ET AL., supra note 347, at 214 (noting that the states are treating domestic
violence as a serious problem, "[t]he efforts [of states] to combat [domestic violence] are ...
more genuine than ever").
380. See infra notes 381-383 and accompanying text.
381. Pursuant to increased public awareness and provisions of the VAWA I, many states have
created task forces with the responsibility of investigating the presence of gender bias in the
justice system and recommending remedial actions. See Swent, supra note 368, at 29, Table 3
(reporting the results of task force investigations in fourteen states).
382. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 3 (discussing the fact that "[slociety now widely accepts
intrafamily abuse as a crucial goal . . ." yet noting that "state intervention in family violence
cases has long undermined any meaningful government response"). It has been this incredible
public response, grounded in the movement of women's groups over the last twenty-five years
that led to the enactment of the VAWA I. See generally MARY LYSTAD ET AL., Domestic
Volence, in FAMILY VIOLENCE: A CLINICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE 140 (Sandra J. Kaplan ed.,
1996) (discussing the progress made by women's groups in bringing family violence to the pub-
lic's attention).
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bility, along with the financial incentives provided by the VAWA I, has
encouraged the enactment of state anti-violence legislation across the
country.383
Although there is still room for improvement, the realization that
domestic violence affects society as a whole, and that there is a need
for a solution rather than a quick fix, has spawned incredible growth
in the attack on domestic violence. States have acknowledged the
need for women to feel protected by the system, both when they first
leave the abuser, as well as during the period when they are seeking
justice. 384 Accordingly, every state has enacted civil protection order
statutes385 and provisions for emergency ex-parte relief for victims at-
tempting to leave an alleged abuser. These protection orders demand
that the alleged abuser stay away from the victim, her home, her
workplace, and her family, until the outcome of the case or for a spe-
cific duration. The protection statutes also provide support for the
victim in her attempt to regain control of her life, providing that the
state will charge the abuser criminally if he violates the order.386
The limit on the state legislative development has been the legisla-
tures' inability to enforce the legislation; this remains the duty of the
police and the court system.387 In this situation, the state legislatures
have been proactive, creating legislation that mandates or encourages
the state court systems, as well as local jurisdictions, to enforce protec-
tive legislation. Since 1994, all fifty states have enacted some sort of
domestic violence arrest policy, 388 thereby limiting the amount of dis-
cretion available to the police. 38 9 These policies, coupled with further
383. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 4 (discussing the "remarkable progress made by legisla-
tors" in the context of domestic violence).
384. See supra note 113 (discussing why women do not leave violent relationships).
385. See Buel, supra note 113 (characterizing the civil protection order as "essential relief
necessary for battered women to leave an abusive relationship"). Civil protection orders remain
the most requested form of relief by domestic violence victims, although without enforcement by
the other members of the legal system a protection order does not benefit the victim as it should.
For an example of a civil order of protection, see 3 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FROM A PRIVATE
MAI'ER TO A FEDERAL OFFENSE 1-12, "The Civil Justice System's Response to Domestic Vio-
lence" (Patricia G. Barnes ed. 1998) [hereinafter DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FROM A PRIVATE
MATTER].
386. All fifty states now have criminal contempt statutes in place for violators of civil protec-
tive orders, thus, the violation of a civil protection order is considered a crime against the state.
For a thorough discussion of civil protection orders, the requirements for obtaining one and the
benefits to the order, see Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for
Battered Women: An Analysis ofState Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 801-1019
(1993).
387. See infra notes 397-407 and accompanying text.
388. See supra Part III.B.l.b. (discussing various arrest policies).
389. See supra notes 113-134 and accompanying text (discussing the troubling effects of police
discretion in whether to arrest an alleged abuser in a domestic violence situation).
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educational programs and domestic violence training for both law en-
forcement and court personnel, 390 have begun to make a dramatic dif-
ference in the statistics concerning domestic violence.
Statistics support the conclusion that the state legislatures have be-
gun to respond to the problem of domestic violence, addressing this
very personal crime with victim-focused legislation.391 With the con-
tinued state legislative fight against domestic violence, the loss of Title
III does not signify the end of the fight against domestic violence. De-
spite the legislative advancements, the quest for an end to the prob-
lem of domestic violence has only begun to take shape. "[A] law is
only as good as the system that delivers on its promises, ' '392 thus, the
states must continue to improve upon the methods of dealing with
domestic violence and those who suffer as a result.393 To fully com-
prehend the proactive stance of the states and the continued quest for
further advancement in dealing with domestic violence, it is necessary
to examine the response of state law enforcement and court
personnel. 394
b. Police Response
The states' response to domestic violence must begin with ensuring
law enforcement participation. 395 Police officers take an oath to pro-
tect the public; unfortunately, for many years the police officers' defi-
nition of the public did not include domestic violence victims.
Accordingly, a large amount of federal legislation, including the
VAWA I, has been enacted to provide incentives for the states to im-
prove the response of law enforcement to the needs of domestic vio-
lence victims. 396 States and communities across the country have
responded to these incentives. In addition, states have responded to
law enforcement's failure to take domestic violence victims seriously
390. See supra note 52 (citing to a provision of the VAWA I that provides funding to states
that implement further training and educational programs for law enforcement and court per-
sonnel concerning domestic violence).
391. See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
392. Epstein, supra note 15, at 4.
393. See KAPLAN, supra note 382, at 167 (discussing issues relating to victims of domestic
violence and noting that "cases of partner abuse are likely to be adequately and fully addressed
only within the criminal justice system").
394. For an analysis of the historical problems with law enforcement and court personnel
faced by domestic violence victims, see supra Part III.A.1.
395. See supra notes 115-134 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of law en-
forcement in the fight against domestic violence).
396. See supra notes 372, 374-379 and accompanying text (discussing the incentives of in-
creased funding awarded to the states for creating training and educational programs concerning
domestic violence).
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through the implementation of training and education programs on
dealing with domestic violence situations. 397
These programs serve as reminders to police officers that domestic
violence victims are the victims of violent crime, regardless of their
relationships with their abusers, and encourage the officers to treat
the crimes just as seriously as they would treat stranger violence. The
focus of many of these programs has been to dispel the stereotypes
about family violence 398 and to educate police officers about the se-
verity of domestic violence. 399 These programs, coupled with proac-
tive arrest policies, have brought about dramatic results thus far. The
number of homicides resulting from domestic violence has decreased
by over fifty percent in Los Angeles and New York City since 1996. 4oo
Hard numbers such as these, along with the increase in funding from
the federal government, spur the leadership of law enforcement in
states across the country to continue training and educating their
officers. 401
Domestic violence training helps police officers handle situations in
which they must decide whether to arrest the abuser, or, as in certain
states, where they are required to arrest the alleged abuser regardless
of the victim's wishes.402 Arrests represent the first step in holding an
abuser accountable for his crimes and helping a victim change her life.
Historically, police officers took the position that arrests in domestic
397. At least twenty-five states and the District of Columbia require entry-level domestic vio-
lence training for police officers. For an example of the type of domestic violence training many
officers receive, see Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission handout, in DOMES-
TIC VIOLENCE: FROM A PRIVATE MAT'ER, supra note 385, at 77.
398. See supra notes 118, 121, 124 and accompanying text (discussing the historical response
of law enforcement to domestic violence situations).
399. For an example of domestic violence training that informs officers as to the warning signs
of homicidal abusers, see DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FROM A PRIVATE MATTER, supra note 385, at
77. From 1986 to 1992, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted a research study on training
programs for law enforcement concerning domestic violence for an overview of the results, see
National Institute of Justice, Evaluation of Family Violence Training Programs (1995), at http://
www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/famvio.txt (last visited March 23, 2001).
400. Hart, supra note 116, at 212.
401. In many cities across the country, proactive domestic violence policies have decreased
domestic violence and have resulted in the creation of specialized domestic violence units. For
example, in 1996, Quincy, Massachusetts, a city of 90,000, reported that they had not had a
domestic homicide in over ten years. "Long-Term Effectiveness" in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
FROM A PRIVATE MATTER, supra note 385, at 76. The Quincy Police Department had imple-
mented domestic violence education and policies over a period of twenty years. Id. "In addition
to standard recruit training and state-mandated training, Quincy police officers receive twenty
additional hours of domestic violence training." Id. This increased training teaches the officers
to counsel the victim and collect evidence at the scene so as to make prosecution, without the
victim's cooperation, a possibility. Id.
402. This is called "mandatory arrest." See supra note 133 and infra note 406 and accompany-
ing text.
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situations were to be avoided, due to the belief that domestic violence
was a private issue.40 3 However, this view is being replaced by the
belief that the police have the responsibility of protecting citizens, and
in a case of domestic violence, it is even more important that the of-
ficers intervene on behalf of the victim. 40 4 In response to legislation
passed by more proactive state lawmakers, and the increase in educa-
tion about domestic violence, every police officer in this country now
has the ability to make an arrest in a domestic violence situation pro-
vided that there is probable cause. 40 5
The days when the police responded to a domestic violence call and
left without making an arrest are over. Since 1990, over twenty-five
states have enacted mandatory arrest policies in domestic violence sit-
uations.40 6 Mandatory arrest policies dispel with police discretion,
the root of the problem with the response to domestic violence.
Mandatory arrests actually help the victim, although taking away her
control of the situation,40 7 because she is not forced to make an imme-
diate decision on whether to press charges against her abuser. These
policies effectively remove the alleged abuser from the situation and
allow the victim time to think. Further, in communities with advocacy
programs, this type of policy allows an advocacy program access to the
403. See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
404. Many commentators feel that arrest does not serve as a deterrent, but rather only in-
creases the likelihood that the abuser will take revenge on the victim when he is released from
custody.
405. These are termed "permissive arrest statutes" and are the baseline for domestic violence
arrest policies. For further discussion of these statutes see Pamela Blass Bracher, Comment,
Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence: The City of Cincinnati's Simple Solution to a Complex
Problem, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 166-68 (1996) (explaining that many states have adopted per-
missive arrest statutes that allow police officers to make warrantless arrests in certain
circumstances).
406. For examples of mandatory arrest statutes, see Cecelia M. Espenoza, No Relief for the
Weary: VAWA Relief Denied for Battered Immigrants Lost in the Intersections, 83 MARQ. L. REV.
163, 182-91, n.103 (1999); Adler, supra note 114, at n.12.
407. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, this is one of the biggest criticisms of
mandatory arrest policies. Many critics claim that mandatory arrests actually harm the victim by
fostering the feeling of helplessness and controlling the victim just as her abuser had done. Most
critics of mandatory arrest policies criticize law enforcement's focus on punishing the batterer
and not empowering the victim. See Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the
Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 551 (1999) (stating that mandatory state
interventions "are in danger of replicating the rejection, degradation, terrorization, social isola-
tion, missocialization, exploitation, emotional unresponsiveness, and close confinement that are
endemic to the abusive relationship"); Bracher, supra note 405, at 179 (noting that mandatory
arrest fails to "address the causes underlying the violence"); Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest
of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV.
1133, 1164 (1994) (finding that mandatory arrest policies are "not likely to deter subsequent
violence").
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victim without the abuser's threatening presence. 40 8 Besides helping
the victim in the immediate situation, mandatory arrest policies
demonstrate that the states are beginning to recognize that domestic
violence is a crime not only against the victim, but also against the
state.
40 9
In a mandatory arrest jurisdiction, the police officer must arrest the
suspect if there is probable cause that a domestic violence incident
occurred. 41 0 These policies have resulted in an increase in domestic
violence arrests. For example, in Washington, D.C., the percentage of
domestic violence arrests after the enactment of a mandatory arrest
policy jumped from five to forty-one percent. 411 An increase in the
number of arrests should correspondingly result in an increase in the
number of domestic abusers punished and, consequently, the number
of victims that are effectively helped.
In a majority of states, preferred arrest policies are in place. 412 In a
preferred arrest situation, the police officer has more discretion than
in a mandatory arrest, but can still act regardless of the victim's
wishes. 413 These policies, unlike mandatory arrests, allow the victim
to have input in the outcome of the situation, however, the decision is
still ultimately left to the police. Preferential arrest statutes usually
contain language from the legislature that encourages arrests in cer-
408. In fiscal year 1999, the Violence Against Women Office, in conjuction with the Depart-
ment of Justice, pursuant to the VAWA I, made over $21 million of grants available to communi-
ties who established legal advocacy and domestic violence victim advocacy programs. See U.S.
Department of Justice, Justice Department Announces $21.9 Million to Assist Victims of Domestic
Violence, at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/. . .1999/0000970722&EDATE=Jun+25+1999.
htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2000). For example, in Cook County, Illinois, the Domestic Violence
Courthouse houses a community-based advocacy program. The main purpose of the advocacy
program is to provide domestic violence victim with information concerning protection orders,
shelters, legal counsel, and court proceedings. The advocacy programs are under no obligation
to share information with the prosecution or defense: their obligation is solely to the victim and
the victim's well-being. Id.
409. The fact that domestic violence crimes are crimes against the state is a very important
element that has historically been overlooked in the domestic violence context. See supra note
14 and accompanying text. In no other criminal situation does a victim have the right to prevent
the state from arresting her attacker.
410. Epstein, supra note 15, at 14.
411. Id. at 15.
412. As of 1999, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia had adopted preferred ar-
rest policies. Violence Against Women Office, Breaking the Cycle of Violence, at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo/laws/cycle.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2000) [hereinafter VAWO Website:
Arrests].
413. See Bracher, supra note 405, at 168-70 (discussing Ohio's preferential arrest statute and
the concern of the legislature that police discretion be limited). See also Welch, supra note 407,
at 1151 (discussing preferential arrest statutes as "pro-arrest" statutes).
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tain situations or fact patterns.414 In encouraging, but not mandating,
arrests, the state places its confidence in the police officers and en-
courages the officers to take a more educated role in the process of
handling domestic crimes. Of course, the success of arrest policies de-
pends on the continued training of officers in order to dispel stereo-
types about domestic violence, and instruct them on how to deal with
these types of situations.
One of the most important areas where these arrest policies have
begun to make a difference is in the enforcement of civil protection
orders. 415 Enforcement of protection orders is arguably the most im-
portant duty of the criminal justice system in combating domestic vio-
lence. Protection orders provide the victim with time and space away
from her abuser, as well as the right to stay in her home and keep her
children. 416 Protection orders were a main concern of the VAWA I,
thus, funding was made available to states that adopted more stringent
arrest policies and made a concentrated effort to enforce protection
orders.417 Through enacting these proactive policies and coupling
them with domestic violence training for police officers, the states
have attempted to respond to Congress' concerns with varying de-
grees of success.
c. Response of Prosecutors
Along with the statutes enacted to increase arrests, state legislatures
responded to the incentives under the VAWA I by implementing
guidelines for prosecutors who deal with domestic violence cases.
These policies represented vast improvements over the automatic
drop policies concerning domestic violence that had been in place in
most states. Automatic drop policies allowed the abuser to coerce the
victim into dropping the charges, and effectively allowed the abuser to
control the legal system that should have been punishing the of-
fender. 418 Acknowledging this control and the effect it has on a vic-
tim's rights, states have responded by enacting policies such as no-
414. For instance, in the twenty-seven states with preferred arrest policies, the laws adopted
encourage arrest when "there is probable cause that he or she has assaulted a family member or
has violated a domestic violence protection order." See VAWO Website: Arrests, supra note 412.
415. Research has shown that along with enforcement, "the effectiveness of civil protection
orders for victims of family violence depends on how specific and comprehensive the orders are
... National Institute of Justice, Civil Protection Orders: Victims' Views on Effectiveness
U.S.D.O.J. (Jan. 1998). For a review of research conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice
concerning domestic violence victims' views on the effectiveness of civil protection orders, see id.
416. See supra notes 385-386 and accompanying text.
417. See S. REP. No. 103-138 at 34 (1993).
418. For a discussion of the reluctance of the prosecutor to pursue charges without the coop-
eration of the victim, see supra notes 137-146 and accompanying text.
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drop prosecution 41 9  and mandatory participation policies for
victims. 420
No-drop prosecution policies dictate that once charges are brought,
the case will proceed regardless of the victim's wishes, "as long as suf-
ficient evidence exists to prove criminal conduct. '421 Similar to
mandatory arrests, no-drop prosecution takes the decision out of the
hands of the victim, and some claim it fails to allow victim input and
perpetuates her status as a victim. 422 Although this is a valid concern,
the increase in domestic violence abusers who have been punished as
a result of the no-drop policies and the corresponding drop in intimate
murders support the continued use of this proactive policy.423 This
policy encourages the prosecutor to treat the case as if there was no
complaining witness, effectively increasing the chances that evidence
and other witnesses will be collected, thereby increasing the possibility
of a conviction.
Although many women's groups disagree with this type of policy,424
it is achieving results in the area of domestic violence. In developing
effective prosecutorial policies concerning domestic violence, there is
no way to satisfy all parties. Despite the arguments against it, "no-
drop prosecution policies have moved domestic violence criminal
prosecutions to a position of rough parity with crimes perpetrated by
non-intimates and have greatly expanded the tools available to bat-
tered women seeking to escape abuse. '425 This statement is true be-
cause in no other area of criminal law does a state defer its decision of
whether to prosecute a defendant to the victim. Accordingly, for do-
mestic violence to be treated as a serious crime, it must be treated the
same as any other crime against the state.
Some states have gone beyond encouraging prosecution by creating
domestic violence task forces that consist of specially trained prosecu-
tors, victim advocates, and investigators who deal with the recurring
419. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 15 (discussing the adoption of "no-drop" policies and the
benefits of such policies).
420. See generally Hanna, No Right to Choose, supra note 359 (discussing the importance of
mandatory participation policies).
421. Epstein, supra note 15, at 15.
422. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
423. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 15-17 (citing to statistics that show that no-drop policies
have resulted in a decrease in domestic homicides, as well as "lower recidivism").
424. The majority of criticism concerning "no-drop" prosecutorial policies centers on the fur-
ther helplessness of the victim. According to many critics, this type of policy further victimizes
the woman by taking away her choice of whether to prosecute her abuser. See supra note 364.
425. Epstein, supra note 15, at 16.
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cases, as well as the more serious incidents of domestic violence.426
The idea of the domestic violence task force stems from federal fund-
ing provisions427 and represents the most aggressive and proactive
stances against domestic violence seen in this country, focusing not
only on deterrence and punishment, but also in helping the victim and
rehabilitating the abuser.428 This complete approach to domestic vio-
lence situations is an attempt by the states to address the problem at
its root, while still holding the batterer responsible for his actions. In
these situations, the prosecutor becomes adept at dealing with both
parties, as well as overcoming any problems with the judiciary.429
From proactive prosecutorial policies to task forces focused on do-
mestic violence, states have taken the appropriate steps in beginning
to address the seriousness of the domestic violence epidemic. Al-
though the system is far from operating in the best interest of the vic-
tim at all times, it is apparent that the states have finally begun to take
the problem of domestic violence seriously. The damage created by
the historical inaction of the state legal system cannot be undone in a
few years. These policies and reactions are important steps in the
right direction, but the states must continue to implement aggressive
policies and ensure that they are enforced. Perhaps the most impor-
tant element of the system that requires the most improvement is the
state judicial system.
d. Judicial Response
When enacting legislation, the states did not forget the judiciary and
the inherent gender bias that still lingers within courtrooms. Many
states, taking advantage of the funding made available through the
VAWA I, have created task forces to study the gender bias in the
courts and have made recommendations concerning the issue.430 As a
result of these findings, which have shown that gender bias is still ram-
pant,431 educational programs and training sessions concentrating on
426. Cook County, Illinois, had created such a task force. The personnel in charge of the task
force considers their job a promotion, rather than a demotion as those who have traditionally
dealt with domestic violence have felt. (information on file with author).
427. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 13 (1993) (authorizing the Justice Department to create a
Domestic Violence Task Force).
428. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 15.
429. For a discussion of specialized domestic violence courtrooms, see infra note 437 and ac-
companying text.
430. See supra note 368; Amrit K. Sidhu, More Gender Fairness Needed in Law, 25 Mor.
LAWYER 30 (Nov. 1999) (discussing the findings of gender bias in the Montana judicial system
by its task force).
431. See Swent, supra note 368, at 55-59 (discussing the gender bias found in the judicial sys-
tem by state task forces concerning domestic violence victims).
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remedying judicial bias have been implemented by the states. Many
of these programs are specifically targeted to the treatment of domes-
tic violence crimes and its victims. 432 This in turn not only improves
the way victims are treated, but also enhances the judge's ability to
understand the situation that he or she encounters in the
courtroom.
433
These education and training programs, created by the states, re-
present the future of the justice system. The states that have enacted
these programs have utilized different methods and philosophies in
their implementation, resulting in a need for a more cohesive and
blanket training model. The Violence Against Women Office has
been active in helping states develop programs and has created crite-
ria that education programs should address.434 Despite all of these
efforts, change is difficult; the concern still remains that members of
the judiciary will be resentful of the required participation in these
programs. It is too early to see the actual results of these programs
and whether they are making any real difference, however, they can
only help.435
Along with increased training, many states have created domestic
violence courtrooms that, similar to the domestic violence task force,
addresses only domestic violence cases. These types of courtrooms
are beneficial because they create an environment where the judge
and the courtroom personnel handle this type of situation on a day to
432. For an analysis of the historical treatment of domestic violence victims in the state court
systems, see supra notes 143-163 and accompanying text.
433. Many times the victim might seem disassociated from her injuries or the situation, telling
her story in a flat voice, while the defendant seems calm and collected. Other times the victim
might seem more angry than upset, or they might even seem bizarre. These emotions are often
tied to the psychological effects of the abuse and it is important that the judge understand that it
has nothing to do with the credibility of the victim's story. For a discussion of these symptoms,
as well as other factors of Battered Woman Syndrome, see Stark, supra note 347, at 997-1004.
434. VAWO website, supra note 360.
435. It is important that the judges who sentence domestic violence defendants and deal with
domestic violence victims understand the ramifications of their sentences to both parties. The
goal of the state criminal justice system should be twofold: first, to hold the abuser accountable
for his actions and second, to end the cycle of abuse. For these reasons, judges need to have a
better understanding of the batterer programs that are available and the advocacy groups that
can help. See Kerry Murphy Healey & Christine Smith, Batterer Programs: What Criminal Jus-
tice Agencies Need to Know, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (1998), at http://www.ncjrs.org/
pdffiles/171683.pdf (last visited March 23, 2001) (reporting on the different types of battering
programs that are implemented across the country and discussing the need for judges and proba-
tion officers to be educated about the program goals and methods). For a thorough study on the
effectiveness of the different types of batter intervention programs, see generally Kerry Healey,
Ph.D., Christine Smith & Chris O'Sullivan, Ph.D., Batterer Intervention: Program Approaches
and Criminal Justice Strategies, in ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, NATIONAL IN-
STITUTE OF JUSTICE, NCJ 168638 (February 1998).
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day basis, and are therefore more likely to understand the nuances of
a domestic violence situation.436 These courtrooms also serve as an
enforcer, they have the ability to trace multiple offenders, enforce
protection orders, and deal with situations before they become fa-
tal.437 These courtrooms usually provide access to victim advocacy
groups and are better suited to provide additional information to a
victim who is looking for assistance.
Many states that have created domestic violence courtrooms and
task forces have begun to create databases that make it easier to track
and identify repeat abusers. The Violence Against Women Office has
made the creation of such databases easier by providing additional
funding to the states that implement these systems. The databases
make it more likely that intervention will occur and increase the
state's ability to enforce civil protection orders.
In addition to implementing fundamental changes in the legal sys-
tem, many states have implemented programs that require the legal
system to coordinate its efforts with the community when dealing with
domestic violence crimes. This is a large step in dealing with domestic
violence, as it requires the state to acknowledge that the criminal jus-
tice system is not equipped to remedy domestic violence alone.
e. Advocacy Programs and Community Response
One aspect of the criminal justice system that has been ignored is
the need for community support, especially in the context of domestic
violence. Only recently have states and communities begun to coordi-
nate their actions in fighting domestic violence. These coordinated
programs have been encouraged by the Violence Against Women Of-
fice, which allocates money to states who focus on a comprehensive
domestic violence plan that incorporates community agencies and vic-
tim advocates. 438
This new approach to dealing with domestic violence sends a pow-
erful message; that society is not only concerned with domestic vio-
lence, but also that it will no longer look the other way. This
436. Some critics of this response claim that judges who deal only with domestic violence
cases are unable to be neutral in their dealings with defendants.
437. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 28-34 (discussing the benefits to the integrated domestic
violence courtrooms).
438. For example, the STOP grants are awarded to states that develop and strengthen their
criminal justice system's response to violence against women and are used to support and en-
hance services for victims. The grant is conditioned upon the state allocating twenty-five percent
to law enforcement, prosecution and victim services respectively. Violence Against Women Of-
fice, Violence Against Women Office-Application Kits, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov./vawo/applica-
tionkits.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2000).
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comprehensive program acknowledges that domestic violence affects
its victims in an individual and traumatic way, and the only way to end
the cycle of abuse is to intervene on both sides. Through these pro-
grams, victim advocates now have an integral role in the criminal jus-
tice process and the well being of the victim becomes a priority.
Victim advocates may call the victim before the court's proceedings
to explain the process or to field any of the victim's questions. Advo-
cates provide the victim with someone who will listen to her story and
provide her with an unbiased opinion. They are there to encourage,
counsel, and most of all, represent the victim's needs. Advocates also
provide victims with information about civil protection orders in the
event the criminal charges are unsuccessful, they provide victims with
information about community services, as well as contacts that a vic-
tim might need in order to escape the abuse.
Victim advocates and community organizations provide invaluable
services to domestic violence victims and, in collaboration with the
criminal justice system, have enhanced the states' roles in protecting
the victim's interests. The states' legislation dealing with each phase
of the criminal justice system, as well as their encouragement of advo-
cacy programs through supplemental funding, have resulted in great
advances in the way domestic violence situations are handled. Be-
yond these improvements, the states have also responded by imple-
menting legislation that recognizes domestic violence, and other
gender-motivated violence, as bias crimes.
2. Hate Crimes and Civil Remedies in State Law
Contrary to what Congress found in 1990, many states have re-
sponded to the epidemic of gender-motivated violence, as a result of
political and social concerns, by enacting statutes that provide civil
rights remedies for victims of gender-motivated violence, including
domestic violence. For example, many state codes include "hate
crime" or malicious harassment provisions that recognize gender bias
in their criminal laws. 439 Similar to Title III, these types of statutes
provide an important tool to fully address the bias element of gender-
motivated violence and the civil rights harm that results from such
439. See Appendix: State and Local Hate Crime Laws, at http://lark.cc.ukans.edu/-prex/app-
hcl.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2001) (listing the states that have enacted hate crime laws and the
status of those laws). For a discussion of the pros and cons of state have crime laws, see Hate
Crimes Legislation, at wysimyg://7l3http://www.religioustolerance.org/homhatl.htm (last visited
Feb. 20, 2001).
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crimes.440 Accordingly, these types of statutes also provide an alterna-
tive to Title III.
Currently, over nineteen states include gender in their bias crime
laws, yet there is a notable lack of reported cases involving gender-
based crimes.44' The lack of use does not mean that these laws should
be considered any less meaningful, as their presence illustrates that
the states recognize gender-motivated violence as an issue and they
provide potential remedies for battered women.
Under these types of statutes, just as under Title III, a battered
woman can control her own case and in turn may collect damages
from her abuser. Since Title III has been found unconstitutional, Con-
gress should consider providing further incentives to the states for en-
acting gender-bias statutes. Although these statutes are not national
legislation, they still provide domestic violence victims with a civil
right to be free from gender-motivated violence.
For example, California represents one of the many states that pro-
vides a civil law cause of action for gender-motivated violence.442 A
quick look at its statute illustrates how a state could address the prob-
lem. The California statute is based on a hate crime model, however,
similar to Title III, it also provides potential remedies for battered
women. 443 California was one of the first states to recognize a right to
be free from gender-motivated violence declaring that444 "[a]ll per-
sons.., have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by
threat of violence, committed against their persons or property be-
cause of their . . . sex. ' '445 A civil cause of action further enforces this
recognizable right:
440. Beyond these types of civil remedies, domestic violence victims may still bring a civil tort
action against their abusers to collect damages. Historically, tort actions were precluded in many
domestic situation based on marital privilege. Over the last twenty years, almost all of the states
have done away with the marital privilege. For a discussion of the tort actions available to do-
mestic violence victims, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MARITAL & PARENTAL TORTS: A
GUIDE TO CAUSES OF ACTION, ARGUMENTS AND DAMAGES 3-4 (1990); Daniel G. Atkins et al.,
Striving for Justice With the Violence Against Women Act and Civil Tort Actions, 14 Wis.
WOMEN'S L.J. 69, 69-99 (1999) (exploring the possibility of using civil tort actions on behalf of
domestic violence victims through one woman's story); Mary Alice Cleve, Comment, Is There
Liability for a "Stinger in the Tongue"? Psychological Spousal Abuse Defined, 3 WIDENER J.
PUB. L. 895, 909-915 (1994) (calling for psychological domestic abuse to be adopted as a civil tort
action).
441. See Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful Paradigm For
Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 123, 139 (1999).
442. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(b) (West 1992).
443. Id. (providing that a victim who brings a cause of action under this section is entitled to
actual damages, as well as attorney fees).
444. See Brenneke, supra note 49, at 36.
445. Id. at 37 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7 (West 1992)).
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Whoever denies the right provided by § 51.7, or whoever aids, in-
cites, or conspires in such denial, is liable for each and every such
offense for the actual damages .... suffered by any person denied
that right and in addition.... exemplary damages,.., a civil penalty
of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the per-
son denied that right and attorney's fees. 446
Actual damages include general and special damages. 447 The person
aggrieved by the conduct, as well as the state attorney general, district
attorneys, or city attorneys, can bring complaints pursuant to this
section.448
The primary advantage of the civil rights statutes that have been
enacted by the states is that they do not require state action, which
can be difficult to prove, and the plaintiff need not demonstrate depri-
vation of any independent underlying right. The language of the ex-
isting statutes, such as the California statute illustrated above, has
broad applicability in practice and provides excellent tools that bat-
tered women may use to gain justice through the state court system.
3. Equal Rights Amendments to State Constitutions
Some states have addressed gender-bias by amending their state
constitutions to protect women. When discussing the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA), the first thing that comes to mind is the failed
attempt to amend the United States Constitution on behalf of gender
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 449 In the wake of the failed amend-
ment, many states began to amend their own constitutions with an
ERA focusing on gender equality. Similar to the bias crime statutes in
other states, state ERAs protect women and provide domestic vio-
lence victims with a cause of action for damages. One problem with
relying on ERAs, similar to the problems with bias crime statutes, is
that not all states have amended their constitutions to include such a
provision. Consequently, not all women in the country are protected.
One state that does have an ERA, as well as other civil rights laws,
is Massachusetts. Massachusetts protects women from discrimination
in contract and property rights. 450 Deprivation of these rights could
be shown in the context of a battered woman who has been kept out
446. CAL. CIv. CODE § 52(b) (West 1992).
447. Id. at § 52(h) (West 1992).
448. Id. at § 52(c) (West 1992).
449. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the Consitution would have required that the
government treat all people alike, irrespective of sex, just as the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment required that people be treated alike irrespective of race. For an in-
depth look at the ERA and the controversy that kept it from being passed see MARY BECKER ET
AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 22-24 (1st ed. 1994).
450. See Brenneke, supra note 49, at 38.
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of her house as punishment and humiliation. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts found that
[s]exual harassment by a person not acting under color of law may
violate secured rights within the meaning of the Massachusetts Civil
Rights Act .... Sexual harassment accomplished by threats, intimi-
dation, or coercion constitutes precisely the kind of conduct pro-
scribed by the act, and is similarly directed toward a class explicitly
protected by Article 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,
including its Equal Rights Amendment.45'
Under Massachusetts' law, violence by a man against a woman in the
domestic context may also qualify as coercion on the basis of sex.452
Massachusetts' ERA is representative of the ERAs found in many
states. A disadvantage to using an ERA as a basis for damages result-
ing from domestic violence, rather than a bias-crime statute, is the
ever evolving definition of "sex" and the lack of case law establishing
guidelines for courts dealing with claims under ERAs. Despite this
limitation, the ERAs implemented in many states represent another
opportunity for a victim of domestic violence to recover damages and
serve to recognize the harms gender-motivated violence can have on
society.453
4. The Battle Should Continue
The efforts of the states to address the problems associated with
gender-motivated violence, particularly domestic violence, have come
a long way with the short lived enactment of Title III. Pursuant to
incentives provided by the provisions of the VAWA I and the in-
creased public awareness on the issue of domestic violence, many
states have begun to implement fundamental changes in how they
deal with domestic violence and its victims.
However, since Title III has been held unconstitutional and the
Thirteenth Amendment may not provide a constitutional basis for its
reenactment, it is imperative that the federal government continue to
support and encourage the states in improving the lives of domestic
violence victims. State action cannot substitute the impact that fed-
eral civil rights legislation would have on society's views concerning
gender-motivated violence, however, in this situation it serves as an
adequate alternative. The VAWA I and Title III represent the begin-
451. O'Connell v. Chasdi, 511 N.E.2d 349, 353 (Mass. 1987).
452. Brenneke, supra note 49, at 37-38.
453. According to the Massachusetts law, a plaintiff who litigates under the Massachusetts
Civil Rights Act and wins may collect reasonable costs and attorney fees. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch.
12, §11H (1992).
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ning of the war against domestic violence, and despite the setback, all
is not lost.
IV. IMPACT
The impact of the VAWA I is apparent in the changes that the states
have made in dealing with domestic violence and the priority it has
become in the legislative context. At this time, the impact of losing
Title III on future legislation is unknown, yet it was already effecting
legislation before Morrison.454 Before the Supreme Court decided the
fate of Title III, the mere threat that Title III might be lost created
roadblocks for further legislative efforts to battle domestic violence.
Thus, if the current situation is an indicator, the loss of Title III could
possibly have more devastating effects than anyone could have
imagined.
A. The Proposed Violence Against Women Act of 1999
Thanks to the great success of the original Act, women and children
now have access to shelters that provide a safe haven from abuse;
police officers are trained to identify abusers and help victims; and
victims of domestic violence and assault have access to counseling
and legal assistance. 455
In 1999, as a result of the dramatic changes documented since the
VAWA I, Congress proposed the second Violence Against Women
Act (the VAWA II). The VAWA II, which has yet to be passed, in-
cludes provisions that reauthorize the funding available to the states
pursuant to the VAWA I, as well as provisions that attack domestic
violence more aggressively.4 56
The tremendous support for the VAWA II dispels the notion that
the VAWA I might have been a singular effort; the new act represents
Congress' continued commitment to making the United States safer
for women. 457 The VAWA II was introduced as a way of indicating
that despite great advancements in the fight against gender-motivated
violence, specifically domestic violence, there are still many issues that
454. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
455. Violence Against Women Office, Biden Introduces Violence Against Women Act II (Janu-
ary 20, 1999), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo/speeches/biden.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2001)
[hereinafter Biden Webpage].
456. See 145 CONG. REC. E78-03 (Jan. 19, 1999) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.) (dis-
cussing the need for reauthorization of funding from the VAWA I and the new provisions that
are included in the VAWA II).
457. See National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, VAWA Reauthorization, at http://
www.ncadv.org/publicpolicy/titlel.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2001) (summarizing the bill and the
reasoning for its creation).
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must be addressed. 458 The challenge the act now faces, passage by the
required number of votes in Congress, ironically, is the result of the
debate over Title III of the VAWA I, the very legislation that led to its
proposal.
1. Provisions of the VAWA II
The VAWA II contained provisions that varied in content from
reauthorization of existing funding,459 to creating new grants for com-
munity groups460 and amending the Federal Hate Crimes and Preven-
tion Act to include gender. 461 The main provision of the VAWA II
was "The Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund," which provided for
the reauthorization of the funding to states dictated by the VAWA I.
The funding provision was set to expire at the end of the 2000 calen-
dar year,462 thus the passing of the VAWA II was essential to maintain
funding.
Beyond reauthorization of the original funding,463 the VAWA II fo-
cused on victim rights in domestic violence situations, and required
that states fulfill stringent requirements to acquire federal grants. For
example, it amended STOP Violence Against Women Formula
Grants464 by increasing funding to "ensure that domestic violence and
sexual assault advocates are involved in planning and implementation
of programs .... ,,465 The VAWA II also mandated that the states
which received these funds give at least thirty-five percent to victim
services. 466
Another funding provision that illustrated the commitment to the
needs of domestic violence victims was the "Battered Women's Shel-
458. Id. See also The Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Bill, H.R. 1248, 106th
Cong. (1999) (entitled "The Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Bill").
459. H.R. 1248, 106th Cong. (1999).
460. Id. at subtitles C & D.
461. See supra note 459.
462. See supra note 457.
463. The VAWA II reauthorizes funding for the following: the National Domestic Violence
Hotline, Grants for Community Initiatives, Education and Training for Judges and Court Per-
sonnel, Grants to Encourage Arrest Policies, Rural Domestic Violence and Child Abuse En-
forcement, National Stalker and Domestic Violence Reduction, Federal Victims' Counselors,
and Victims of Child Abuse Programs. H.R. 1248, 106th Cong. (1999).
464. STOP grants are "awarded to the states, District of Columbia, and territories to develop
and strengthen their criminal justice's reponse to violence against women and to support and
enhance services for victims." Violence Against Women Office, VAWP Grant Descriptions and
Application Kits, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo/applicationkits.htm (last visited Jan. 15,
2001).
465. See supra note 457 and accompanying text.
466. See supra note 457 and accompanying text.
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ters and Services" provision.467 This provision authorized over one
billion dollars to battered women's shelters across the country.468 This
idea represented one of the first entirely community based steps in the
fight against domestic violence. These grants were to be allocated
over the next five years and included "caps [on] spending for training
and technical assistance by State coalitions .... ",469 The grants also
allowed more victims to be helped through community programs, en-
hanced existing services, and gave shelters the financial boost they
needed to provide more meaningful services. This provision also pro-
vided more money to domestic violence programs, other than shelters,
by instructing that any money remaining from the grants was to be
directed to domestic violence programming.
The VAWA II also made additional funding available to the states
for the purpose of promoting intervention and accountability of the
abuser. These provisions provided funds for "the improvement of lo-
cal, state and national crime databases for tracking stalking and do-
mestic violence. '470  The proposed legislation was incredibly
important because the resulting databases allow states and communi-
ties to track abusers and their activities regardless of where they
move. These databases also promote and facilitate communication
between different states and communities about the treatment of re-
peat offenders and the protection of victims. The greatest advantage
of these databases is the resulting validity given to protection orders,
since other agencies have knowledge of the previous actions taken
and, therefore, are more likely to make sure these orders are
enforced.
In addition, the VAWA II served to strengthen stay-away orders in
other ways, by providing victims of domestic violence more security
when attempting to leave an abuser. This provision ensured that
when a domestic violence victim crosses state lines she still has the
protection of her original protection order.471 Although this "Full
Faith and Credit" provision 472 was included in the VAWA I, the
VAWA II "clarifie[d] this provision to ensure meaningful enforce-
ment. '473 The new provision further imposed a penalty upon law en-
467. See supra note 458 and accompanying text.
468. The Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Bill, H.R. 1248,106th Cong., Subtitle
C (1999).
469. Id.
470. See id. This funding provision is titled the "National Stalker and Domestic Violence
Reduction" provision. Id. See supra note 457 and accompanying text.
471. Id.
472. See id.
473. See supra note 459, at E79.
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forcement agencies that have received funding, and yet have failed to
comply with the provision.474 In strengthening the original provision
of the VAWA I, Congress publicly required states to take protection
orders more seriously.
Further, the VAWA II contained provisions that acknowledged the
need for victims to receive support from all facets of their individual
communities. 475 The act specifically encourages job providers to es-
tablish intervention programs and provide education programs 476 by
directing grant money and tax credits to businesses which implement
programs. In creating a "Victim's Employment Rights" provision and
a "Battered Women's Employment Protection" provision, Congress
ensured that abused women will have the opportunity to attend court
and participate in the prosecution of their abusers. These provisions
address the difficult decisions many victims have faced in the past,
such as the choice between whether to proceed with charges against
their abusers or to keep their jobs.
Along with each of these notable provisions helping abused women,
the VAWA II also contained a provision that might be the answer to
the loss of Title III. This provision entitled the "Hate Crimes Preven-
tion Act ' 477 (Act) amended federal hate crimes legislation to finally
include gender-motivated crime as bias crime and would further per-
mit federal prosecution for bias crimes based on gender, as well as
sexual orientation and disability.478 In June of 2000, the Act was
passed in the Senate under the name "Local Law Enforcement En-
hancement Act. '479 If the act is passed by the House, it will also pro-
vide for funding for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and federal
law enforcement personnel to encourage assisting state and local law
enforcement. This provision not only creates a federal and state com-
prehensive attack on gender-motivated crime, but it also takes the
much needed step of equating gender with characteristics such as race
and religious affiliation.
These aggressive provisions are only a few of the legislative changes
that the VAWA II offers. The Act denotes dynamic legislation that
continues the fight to educate and inform society about the harm of
474. Id. The provision does allow law enforcement agencies to attempt to come into compli-
ance before a penalty is assessed.
475. H.R. 1248, 106th Cong., Subtitles E-L (1999).
476. Id. at Subtitle F.
477. See Hate Crimes, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?106:s.622: (last visited Jan.
15, 2001).
478. See NOW Website, Legislative Update, at http://www.now.org/issues/legislat/07-06-
00.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2000).
479. Id.
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domestic violence. Each of the provisions were designed to further
the efforts of the states in dealing with the problem of domestic vio-
lence. The VAWA II has one simple goal, to "make more women and
children safe." '480
2. Brzonkala and the Threat to the VAWA II
The VAWA II represents heavy artillery in the war against domestic
violence; artillery that will remain useless as long as it remains a pro-
posal and not enacted legislation. Despite being introduced in Janu-
ary of 1999, the VAWA II has yet to garner the number of necessary
votes, despite widespread support, to be passed by Congress.481 Ironi-
cally, it seems that the legislation that led to the creation of the
VAWA I, might present constitutional concerns that jeopardize the
enactment of the VAWA II.
Although the Morrison48 2 decision only applies to the constitution-
ality of Title III, many senators have used the decision to block the
enactment of the VAWA II. Members of Congress have voiced con-
cern that the decision which held Title III unconstitutional in effect
jeopardizes the remaining provisions of the VAWA I, and in turn,
jeopardizes the reauthorization of the VAWA I funds through the
VAWA II. This presents a severe setback in the movement to eradi-
cate domestic violence, because without the enactment of the VAWA
II, the funding provided to the states pursuant to the VAWA I would
not be reauthorized.
This dilemma represents the ultimate irony; the death of Title III
could ultimately destroy its only effective alternative, comprehensive
state action. Without the reauthorization of funding, it is possible the
many states that have implemented drastic changes in their legal sys-
tem might not be able or willing to financially support these programs.
Regardless, these incentives are necessary to continue the fight in the
war against domestic violence.
The question that remains is whether we can lose the battle over
Title III and still win the war against domestic violence? It is evident
by the proposal of the VAWA II and the continued state action that
victory is a definite possibility. Congress must realize that the Su-
preme Court's decision concerning Title III in Morrison483 affects only
a small portion of the VAWA I, not the constitutionality of the VAWA
480. Biden Webpage, supra note 455.
481. See NOW Website, Legislative Update, at http://www.now.org/issues/legislat/07-06-00.
html (last visited Nov. 16, 2000).
482. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
483. Id.
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I as a whole.484 The other provisions of the VAWA I are constitution-
ally safe and sound, and they remain effective tools in the war against
domestic violence. Accordingly, the enactment of the VAWA II is im-
perative for the fight to continue.
V. CONCLUSION
Domestic violence presents this country's legal system with a per-
plexing dilemma of how to end the cycle of abuse while still protecting
the victim. In the case of Carrie Culberson, the system tragically
failed, as it so often does.485 In her case, the gender bias she exper-
ienced in the legal system resulted in her death. There is no way to
bring Carrie back, yet there is a way to honor her memory, as well as
all of the other victims of domestic violence, by maintaining the ag-
gressive measures against domestic violence founded by the VAWA I.
Despite Title III's importance in spurring the battle against domes-
tic violence, losing Title III does not mean that the war against domes-
tic violence is lost. The Supreme Court cannot completely tie
Congress' hands, and accordingly the fight must continue. From reen-
acting Title III pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, to providing
further incentives to the states for comprehensive domestic violence
plans, or proposing further federal legislation, the federal government
must continue to target this pervasive problem. Although domestic
violence will never be eradicated simply by passing legislation, it de-
notes the most fundamental way to begin changing attitudes and be-
haviors, as well as recognizing domestic violence for the serious crime
that it has become.
Jennifer R. Hagan
484. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing the other provisions of the
VAWA I).
485. See supra note 2.
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